IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ces/ifosdt/v71y2018i24p15-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Target-Risiken ohne Euro-Austritte

Author

Listed:
  • Clemens Fuest
  • Hans-Werner Sinn

Abstract

Die Target-Forderungen der Deutschen Bundesbank entstanden durch die Regeln des Eurosystems und der dadurch erzwungenen Kreditvergabe der deutschen an die übrigen europäischen Zentralbanken. Es gilt heute als unstrittig, dass diese Forderungen im Risiko stehen, sollten Target-Schuldner aus dem Eurosystem austreten. Doch wie steht es mit den Target-Risiken bei Fortbestand des Euro? Target-Salden implizieren auch dann für die Gläubigerstaaten reale Risiken. Besonders problematisch sind die Target-Risiken auch deshalb, weil sie den Handlungsspielraum der Politik begrenzen und die Überschussländer zwingen, sie mit immer wieder neu aufgesetzten Systemen der Gemeinschaftshaftung und der Umverteilung von Steuermitteln zumindest scheinbar im Zaum zu halten. Der Weg in die europäische Transferunion ist vorgezeichnet, wenn es nicht gelingt, die Target-Salden zu begrenzen. Clemens Fuest und Hans-Werner Sinn zeigen in ihrem Beitrag, dass es verschiedene Möglichkeiten gibt, Risiken aus Target-Salden zu begrenzen, ohne die Funktionsfähigkeit der Währungsunion und des gemeinsamen Kapitalmarktes damit zu beeinträchtigen.

Suggested Citation

  • Clemens Fuest & Hans-Werner Sinn, 2018. "Target-Risiken ohne Euro-Austritte," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 71(24), pages 15-25, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:71:y:2018:i:24:p:15-25
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/sd-2018-24-fuest-sinn-target-risiken-2018-12-20.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 468-508, August.
    2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2017. "The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets, and Beliefs," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198791447.
    3. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2015. "Der Euro: Von der Friedensidee zum Zankapfel," Books, by Staff of the ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 2015001.
    4. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2015. "The Euro: From Peace Project to Bone of Contention," Books, by Staff of the ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 201510, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eger, Thomas & Weise, Peter, 2020. "Die Target-Salden in der Eurozone: "Falle" oder Scheinproblem?," Discussion Papers 1/20, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration.
    2. Martin Hellwig, 2019. "Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle? – Zur deutschen Diskussion um die Europäische Währungsunion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2018. "The ECB’s fiscal policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(6), pages 1404-1433, December.
    2. Eger, Thomas & Weise, Peter, 2020. "Die Target-Salden in der Eurozone: "Falle" oder Scheinproblem?," Discussion Papers 1/20, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration.
    3. Frank Westermann, 2018. "Vorstellung der Thesen von Hans-Werner Sinn: Europa: So oder so – eine Einführung in die Themen und Thesen," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 71(18), pages 54-56, September.
    4. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2018. "There is an alternative: A two-tier European currency community," MPIfG Discussion Paper 18/7, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    5. Afflatet Nicolas, 2016. "La malaise française – Frankreichs Haushaltskrise und warum sie anhalten wird," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 075-095, May.
    6. Sinn Hans-Werner, 2019. "Der Streit um die Targetsalden : Kommentar zu Martin Hellwigs Artikel „Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle?“," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 20(3), pages 170-217, September.
    7. Eger Thomas & Schäfer Hans-Bernd, 2016. "Introduction: Eurobonds beyond Crisis Management," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 477-494, November.
    8. Markus Taube & Wolfgang Wiegard & Christoph Kaserer & Daniel Stelter, 2017. "Ten Years After: Eine Bilanz der Finanz- und Weltwirtschaftskrise," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 70(17), pages 03-16, September.
    9. Dieter Dziadkowski, 2016. "Zur künftigen Steuerbelastung in Deutschland," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 69(11), pages 27-33, June.
    10. Yin-Wong Cheung & Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2020. "A Tale of Two Surplus Countries: China and Germany," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 131-158, February.
    11. Steiner, Andreas & Steinkamp, Sven & Westermann, Frank, 2019. "Exit strategies, capital flight and speculative attacks: Europe's version of the trilemma," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 83-96.
    12. Sven Steinkamp & Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2017. "The Euro Area’s Common Pool Problem Revisited: Has the Single Supervisory Mechanism Ameliorated Forbearance and Evergreening?," IEER Working Papers 107, Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrueck University, revised 06 Oct 2017.
    13. Wolfgang Nierhaus & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2016. "ifo Konjunkturumfragen und Konjunkturanalyse: Band II," ifo Forschungsberichte, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 72, July.
    14. Terzi, Alessio, 2020. "Macroeconomic adjustment in the euro area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    15. Shafik Hebous & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2016. "Toward a Mutualization of European Unemployment Insurance? On Limiting the Downsides of a Fiscal Transfer System for the Eurozone," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 62(2), pages 376-395.
    16. von Prollius Michael & Schnabl Gunther, 2016. "Geldpolitik, Arabellion und Flüchtlingskrise: Die sehr lockere Geldpolitik der großen Industrieländer kommt in Form der Flüchtlingskrise auf Europa zurück," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 65(3), pages 299-320, December.
    17. Niklas Potrafke & Markus Reischmann, 2016. "How to Handle the Crisis in Greece? Empirical Evidence Based on a Survey of Economics Experts," CESifo Working Paper Series 5860, CESifo.
    18. Schäfer Hans-Bernd & Bigus Jochen, 2016. "Consequences of Different Eurobond Proposals," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 523-553, November.
    19. Sven Steinkamp & Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2018. "Evergreening in the Euro Area: Facts and Explanation," IEER Working Papers 113, Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrueck University.
    20. Giuseppe Bertola & John Driffill & Harold James & Hans-Werner Sinn & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Ákos Valentinyi, 2014. "Chapter 4: Banking Union: Who Should Take Charge?," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo, vol. 0, pages 91-108, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Zentralbank; Internationaler Zahlungsverkehr; Kreditrisiko; Eurozone; Target-Kredite; EZB;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:71:y:2018:i:24:p:15-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifooode.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.