Bessere europäische Wettbewerbspolitik durch den „more economic approach“ ? Einige Fragezeichen nach den ersten Erfahrungen / Does the more economic approach lead to a better competition policy? Some question marks after the first experiences

The latest reform endeavours in European competition policy primarily aim at realizing a more economic approach. Taking merger control as an example, we ask whether the new approach actually promises an improved competition policy. In merger control, the European Commission intends to realize the more economic approach drawing on precise evaluations of single cases, implying an enhanced role for the rule of reason. It is argued that tins reform might be very costly because the Commission dispenses with the advantages closely connected to per se rules like transparency, predictability and lower transaction costs. The new approach would only be more economical if its benefits - for instance a higher quality of the merger decisions - were higher than its costs. It is argued that this appears unlikely. This critical evaluation is supported by the first cases in which the m|ore economic approach played a role, namely in Sony/BMG. We thus conclude that the more economic approach should put more emphasis on stable and well grounded economic rules.