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Ordnungsökonomische Wettbewerbskonzepte: Die Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Freiheit und Effizienz / Order Economic Concepts of Competition: Competition Policy between Economic Freedom and Efficiency

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  • Schmidt André

Abstract

The more economic approach was implemented in the EU competition policy. Yet, the debate whether the normative foundations of competition law are vital has received new fuel. On the one hand, these normative foundations were derived from welfare economics which emphasize economic efficiency as the ultimate goal of competition law. On the other hand, the order-economic approaches, based on the Freiburg School, focus economic freedom. The paper examines pros and cons of each concept and discusses the perspectives of an approach favoring the order-economic concept. Market dominance serves as an example to show that the more economic approach does not at all grant better results in competition policy. Neither consumer welfare nor static-allocative standards are sufficient criteria for competition law. In accordance with the Freiburg School the author gives a pronounced summing-up for a competition policy tending more to safeguarding the requirements of competition than to its direct results.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidt André, 2008. "Ordnungsökonomische Wettbewerbskonzepte: Die Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Freiheit und Effizienz / Order Economic Concepts of Competition: Competition Policy between Economic Freedom a," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 209-236, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:59:y:2008:i:1:p:209-236:n:12
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2008-0112
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    References listed on IDEAS

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