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The Too-Big-to-Fail Premium in Tier-2 Capital Bonds and Additional Tier-1 Capital Bonds Primary Markets: Evidence from China

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  • Yang Le

    (Tsinghua University Beijing, China)

Abstract

This study examines the too-big-to-fail expectations in the primary market issuance spreads of commercial bank tier-2 capital bonds and additional tier-1 capital bonds in China. Using a sample of 574 issuances with total amount of 4.76 trillion RMB (749 billion USD), we conduct median regressions with the issuance spreads as the dependent variable. The coefficients of DSIB and GSIB are negative and statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively in the full sample, and are negative and statistically significant at 1% level in the subsample after the guidance on asset management businesses was announced. Ceteris paribus, the issuance spreads of capital bonds of systemically important banks are 15.2 bps to 19.7 bps lower than those issued by other banks. The too-big-to-fail expectations and implicit guarantee of systemically important banks in the Chinese bond market, which narrow the primary market spreads of capital bonds issued by systemically important banks, may account for the results. To address the potential endogeneity issues, we use 90% quantile and 95% quantile of sample bank consolidated assets as proxies of systemic importance, and use China Development Bank bond yields to calculate issuance spreads, and the results show that the conclusion is robust.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang Le, 2024. "The Too-Big-to-Fail Premium in Tier-2 Capital Bonds and Additional Tier-1 Capital Bonds Primary Markets: Evidence from China," China Finance and Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 44-63.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:cferev:v:13:y:2024:i:3:p:44-63:n:1003
    DOI: 10.1515/cfer-2024-0015
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