IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/79700.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees

Author

Listed:
  • Acharya, Viral
  • Anginer, Deniz
  • Warburton, Joe

Abstract

Using unsecured bonds traded in the U.S. between 1990 and 2012, we find that bond credit spreads are sensitive to risk for most financial institutions, but not for the largest financial institutions. This “too big to fail” relation between firm size and the risk sensitivity of bond spreads is not seen in the non-financial sectors. The results are robust to using different measures of risk, controlling for bond liquidity, conducting an event study around shocks to investor expectations of government guarantees, examining explicitly and implicitly guaranteed bonds of the same firm, and using agency ratings of government support for financial institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Acharya, Viral & Anginer, Deniz & Warburton, Joe, 2016. "The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees," MPRA Paper 79700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:79700
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79700/1/MPRA_paper_79700.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. S. Mishkin, Frederic, 1999. "Financial consolidation: Dangers and opportunities," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2-4), pages 675-691, February.
    2. Sironi, Andrea, 2003. "Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 443-472, June.
    3. Mr. Luc Laeven & Mr. Fabian Valencia, 2010. "Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," IMF Working Papers 2010/146, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Acharya, Viral V. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2007. "Too many to fail--An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, January.
    5. Francis A. Longstaff & Sanjay Mithal & Eric Neis, 2005. "Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(5), pages 2213-2253, October.
    6. Flannery, Mark J & Sorescu, Sorin M, 1996. "Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1347-1377, September.
    7. Philip E. Strahan, 2013. "Too Big to Fail: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 43-61, November.
    8. Anginer, Deniz & Warburton, A. Joseph, 2014. "The Chrysler effect: The impact of government intervention on borrowing costs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 62-79.
    9. Raddatz, Claudio, 2010. "When the rivers run dry : liquidity and the use of wholesale funds in the transmission of the U.S. subprime crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5203, The World Bank.
    10. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
    11. DeYoung, Robert, et al, 2001. "The Information Content of Bank Exam Ratings and Subordinated Debt Prices," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 900-925, November.
    12. Ueda, Kenichi & Weder di Mauro, B., 2013. "Quantifying structural subsidy values for systemically important financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 3830-3842.
    13. Merton, Robert C, 1974. "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 449-470, May.
    14. Kane, Edward J, 2000. "Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 671-701, August.
    15. Amihud, Yakov, 2002. "Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 31-56, January.
    16. Dick-Nielsen, Jens & Feldhütter, Peter & Lando, David, 2012. "Corporate bond liquidity before and after the onset of the subprime crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(3), pages 471-492.
    17. Bryan Kelly & Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2016. "Too-Systemic-to-Fail: What Option Markets Imply about Sector-Wide Government Guarantees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(6), pages 1278-1319, June.
    18. John Y. Campbell & Glen B. Taksler, 2003. "Equity Volatility and Corporate Bond Yields," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2321-2350, December.
    19. Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2007. "How much would banks be willing to pay to become \"too-big-to-fail\" and to capture other benefits?," Research Working Paper RWP 07-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    20. Duan, Jin-Chuan & Moreau, Arthur F. & Sealey, C. W., 1992. "Fixed-rate deposit insurance and risk-shifting behavior at commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 715-742, August.
    21. Priyank Gandhi & Hanno Lustig, 2015. "Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(2), pages 733-768, April.
    22. Balasubramnian, Bhanu & Cyree, Ken B., 2011. "Market discipline of banks: Why are yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures not sensitive to bank risks?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 21-35, January.
    23. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "On the pricing of contingent claims and the Modigliani-Miller theorem," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 241-249, November.
    24. Penas, Maria Fabiana & Unal, Haluk, 2004. "Gains in bank mergers: Evidence from the bond markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 149-179, October.
    25. O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. "Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
    26. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
    27. Lucas, Deborah & McDonald, Robert L., 2006. "An options-based approach to evaluating the risk of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 155-176, January.
    28. Viral Acharya & Robert Engle & Matthew Richardson, 2012. "Capital Shortfall: A New Approach to Ranking and Regulating Systemic Risks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 59-64, May.
    29. Freixas, Xavier, 1999. "Optimal Bail-Out, Conditionality and Creative Ambiguity," CEPR Discussion Papers 2238, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    30. Roll, Richard, 1984. "A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1127-1139, September.
    31. Julapa Jagtiani & George Kaufman & Catharine Lemieux, 2002. "The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post‐FDICIA Period," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 25(4), pages 559-575, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Randall Kroszner, 2016. "A Review of Bank Funding Cost Differentials," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 151-174, June.
    2. Hett, Florian & Schmidt, Alexander, 2017. "Bank rescues and bailout expectations: The erosion of market discipline during the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(3), pages 635-651.
    3. Cummings, James R. & Guo, Yilian, 2020. "Do the Basel III capital reforms reduce the implicit subsidy of systemically important banks? Australian evidence," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    4. Javed I. Ahmed & Christopher Anderson & Rebecca Zarutskie, 2015. "Are the Borrowing Costs of Large Financial Firms Unusual?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Florian Hett & Alexander Schmidt, 2013. "Bank Bailouts and Market Discipline: How Bailout Expectations Changed During the Financial Crisis," Working Papers 1305, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Aug 2013.
    6. Sungho Choi & Bill B. Francis & Iftekhar Hasan, 2010. "Cross‐Border Bank M&As and Risk: Evidence from the Bond Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 615-645, June.
    7. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2013. "Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 875-894.
    8. Gündüz, Yalin, 2020. "The market impact of systemic risk capital surcharges," Discussion Papers 09/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    9. Völz, Manja & Wedow, Michael, 2009. "Does banks size distort market prices? Evidence for too-big-to-fail in the CDS market," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2009,06, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    10. Fabrizio Crespi & Emanuela Giacomini & Danilo V. Mascia, 2019. "Bail‐in rules and the pricing of Italian bank bonds," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1321-1347, November.
    11. Siegert, Casper & Willison, Matthew, 2015. "Financial Stability Paper 32: Estimating the extent of the ‘too big to fail’ problem – a review of existing approaches," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 32, Bank of England.
    12. Völz, Manja & Wedow, Michael, 2011. "Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 195-210, March.
    13. Sungho Choi & Bill B. Francis & Iftekhar Hasan, 2010. "Cross‐Border Bank M&As and Risk: Evidence from the Bond Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 615-645, June.
    14. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2010_004 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Xuanjuan Chen & Jing-Zhi Huang & Zhenzhen Sun & Tong Yao & Tong Yu, 2020. "Liquidity Premium in the Eye of the Beholder: An Analysis of the Clientele Effect in the Corporate Bond Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(2), pages 932-957, February.
    16. Menz, Klaus-Michael, 2010. "Market discipline and the evaluation of Euro financial bonds--An empirical analysis," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 315-328, September.
    17. Maalaoui Chun, Olfa & Dionne, Georges & François, Pascal, 2014. "Credit spread changes within switching regimes," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 41-55.
    18. Evanoff, Douglas D. & Jagtiani, Julapa A. & Nakata, Taisuke, 2011. "Enhancing market discipline in banking: The role of subordinated debt in financial regulatory reform," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    19. Heller, Yuval & Peleg Lazar, Sharon & Raviv, Alon, 2022. "Banks’ risk taking and creditors’ bargaining power," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    20. Michael G. Arghyrou & Maria Dolores Gadea, 2019. "Private bank deposits and macro/fiscal risk in the euro-area," CESifo Working Paper Series 7532, CESifo.
    21. Moenninghoff, Sebastian C. & Ongena, Steven & Wieandt, Axel, 2015. "The perennial challenge to counter Too-Big-to-Fail in banking: Empirical evidence from the new international regulation dealing with Global Systemically Important Banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 221-236.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Too big to fail; Dodd-Frank; bailout; implicit guarantee; moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:79700. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.