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Do CoCos serve the goals of macroprudential supervisors or bank managers?

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  • Allen, Linda
  • Golfari, Andrea

Abstract

Using a hand-collected, comprehensive sample of contingent capital bonds (CoCos) issued by banks over the 2009–2019 period, we identify shifts in CoCo design features that nullify their putative salutary macroprudential benefits. Increasingly, CoCos are issued without punitive wealth transfers from shareholders to bondholders, thereby removing incentives for bank managers to take preemptive, risk-reducing action in order to prevent the CoCo from triggering. That is, CoCos are overwhelmingly issued with conversion ratios of zero (principal writedowns) that do not mitigate bank risk taking. Further, CoCo issuance can be used to circumvent supervisory discretion over bonus and dividend payouts. That is, CoCos issued as Additional Tier 1 capital relax regulatory constraints, particularly for banks close to the Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA) threshold. Bank managers are aware of these loopholes and exploit them to the detriment of financial market stability and macroprudential objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Linda & Golfari, Andrea, 2023. "Do CoCos serve the goals of macroprudential supervisors or bank managers?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:84:y:2023:i:c:s104244312300029x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2023.101761
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Avdjiev, Stefan & Bogdanova, Bilyana & Bolton, Patrick & Jiang, Wei & Kartasheva, Anastasia, 2020. "CoCo issuance and bank fragility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 593-613.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hilscher, Jens & Raviv, Alon & Wiener, Zvi, 2024. "Dynamic volatility regulation of financial institutions," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CoCo; Contingent capital; Bank capital regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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