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Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?

Author

Listed:
  • Anson Jose

    (Universal Postal Union, jose.anson@upu.int)

  • Cadot Olivier

    (University of Lausanne, olivier.cadot@unil.ch)

  • Olarreaga Marcelo

    (World Bank, marcelo.olarreaga@unige.ch)

Abstract

This paper provides a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. We build a model highlighting the contribution of private surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for underinvoicing and collusive behaviour between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. It is shown theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of fraud. Empirically, our econometric results suggest that the introduction of PSI services increased underinvoicing in Argentina and Indonesia, and reduced it in the Philippines.

Suggested Citation

  • Anson Jose & Cadot Olivier & Olarreaga Marcelo, 2006. "Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-26, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:contributions.5:y:2006:i:1:n:33
    DOI: 10.1515/1538-0645.1600
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lahiri, Bidisha & Ali, Haider, 2022. "Inspections, informal payments and tax payments by firms," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA).
    2. Cyril Chalendard, 2015. "Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting," Working Papers halshs-01179445, HAL.
    3. Joel CARIOLLE & Cyril CHALENDARD & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Bertrand LAPORTE, 2016. "Décloisonner l’analyse des données pour appuyer la modernisation des douanes : une illustration à partir du Gabon," Working Papers 201618, CERDI.
    4. Cosimo Beverelli & Martin T. Braml & Lionel Gérard Fontagné & Alexander Keck & Gianluca Orefice, 2022. "Heterogeneous Trade Effects of Pre-Shipment Inspections," CESifo Working Paper Series 9833, CESifo.
    5. Céline Carrère & Christopher Grigoriou, 2014. "Can Mirror Data Help To Capture Informal International Trade?," UNCTAD Blue Series Papers 65, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
    6. Cyril Chalendard, 2015. "Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting," CERDI Working papers halshs-01179445, HAL.
    7. Joel CARIOLLE & Cyril CHALENDARD & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Bertrand LAPORTE, 2017. "Going beyond analysis of internal data to support customs modernization: A case study in Gabon," Working Papers 201723, CERDI.
    8. Kenneth Abante, 2019. "Minimizing Smuggling and Restoring Public Trust in the Philippine Bureau of Customs," CID Working Papers 113a, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    9. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Vianney DEQUIEDT, 2009. "Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED : une Application des Modèles d’Agence Hiérarchique," Working Papers 200906, CERDI.
    10. Dequiedt, V. & Geourjon, A.-M. & Rota-Graziosi, G., 2012. "Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 282-291.
    11. Sébastien Jean & Cristina Mitaritonna & Antoine Vatan, 2018. "Institutions and Customs Duty Evasion," Working Papers 2018-24, CEPII research center.
    12. Cyril Chalendard & Alice Duhaut & Ana Margarida Fernandes & Aaditya Mattoo & Gael Raballand & Bob Rijkers, 2020. "Does Better Information Curb Customs Fraud?," CESifo Working Paper Series 8371, CESifo.
    13. Cali,Massimiliano & Ghose,Devaki & Montfaucon,Angella Faith Lapukeni & Ruta,Michele, 2022. "Trade Policy and Exporters’ Resilience : Evidence from Indonesia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10068, The World Bank.
    14. Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED : une Application des Modèles d'Agence Hiérarchique," CERDI Working papers halshs-00554331, HAL.
    15. Beverelli, Cosimo & Ticku, Rohit, 2022. "Reducing tariff evasion: The role of trade facilitation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 534-554.
    16. Lorenzo Rotunno & Pierre-Louis Vézina, 2012. "Chinese Networks and Tariff Evasion," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(12), pages 1772-1794, December.
    17. Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," CERDI Working papers halshs-00554316, HAL.
    18. Michael, Bryane & Popov, Maja, 2012. "Do Customs Trade Facilitation Programmes Help Reduce Customs-Related Corruption?," EconStor Preprints 109021, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    19. Mtiraoui, Abderraouf, 2015. "Corruption et développement économique: Application aux secteurs de l’éducation et de la santé dans la zone MENA [Corruption and Economic Development: Application to the sectors of education and he," MPRA Paper 64306, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Temesgen Worku & Juan P. Mendoza & Jacco L. Wielhouwer, 2016. "Tariff evasion in sub-Saharan Africa: the influence of corruption in importing and exporting countries," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(4), pages 741-761, August.
    21. Vaqar, Ahmed & Ghulam, Samad, 2011. "Trade facilitation for economic corridors in South Asia: the perspective of Pakistan," MPRA Paper 31368, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Javorcik, Beata & Narciso, Gaia, 2013. "Accession to the World Trade Organization and Tariff Evasion," CEPR Discussion Papers 9592, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Velea, Irina & Cadot, Olivier & Wilson, John S., 2010. "Do private inspection programs affect trade facilitation ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5515, The World Bank.
    24. Ederington,Josh & Ruta,Michele, 2016. "Non-tariff measures and the world trading system," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7661, The World Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tariff evasion; underinvoicing; pre-shipment inspection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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