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Horizontal Networks and Economic Performance: Evidence from City Leaders in China

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  • Danglun Luo
  • Congcong Liu
  • Lifan Wu

Abstract

Objectives We examine political connections at the horizontal level of local government officials and their impacts on economic growth in China. Methods We identify two types of horizontal networks: hometown tie and alumni tie, and analyze the biographic data of the top officials of 256 prefecture‐cities during the period of 1999–2013. Results We find a positive relationship between city leaders’ hometown tie and economic growth, measured by either the relative GDP per capita growth rate or the GDP per capita growth rate. Furthermore, we find the positive relationship is more profound in the low market‐open cities. However, we do not find any significant impacts of the alumni tie on economic growth. Conclusions The hometown tie improves the city leaders’ economic performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Danglun Luo & Congcong Liu & Lifan Wu, 2020. "Horizontal Networks and Economic Performance: Evidence from City Leaders in China," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1359-1373, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:101:y:2020:i:4:p:1359-1373
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12816
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