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Local officials’ tenure and CO2 emissions in China

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Listed:
  • Tian, Zhihua
  • Hu, An
  • Chen, Yang
  • Shao, Shuai

Abstract

Under China’s unique decentralized governance mechanism, local officials’ career incentive mode and behavioral preferences have an important impact on CO2 emission reduction. Based on a panel data set including local officials’ experience information, this paper investigates the impact and mechanism of local officials’ tenure on CO2 emissions in China. We find that CO2 emissions show an inverted U-shaped trend of rising first and then falling during the governors’ tenure, with the peak occurring in their nearly fourth year in office. The strategic investment and fiscal policies implemented by officials during their tenure provide an explanation for this finding. In particular, introducing CO2 emission reduction targets in the evaluation system of local officials shifts the strategic arrangements implemented by local officials during their tenure, with no significant effect of provincial governors’ tenure on CO2 emissions. Our findings provide empirical evidence for China’s shift from a GDP-based official evaluation system to a green GDP.

Suggested Citation

  • Tian, Zhihua & Hu, An & Chen, Yang & Shao, Shuai, 2023. "Local officials’ tenure and CO2 emissions in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:173:y:2023:i:c:s0301421522006139
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113394
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    Cited by:

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    2. Yan Fu & Jiaxing Cao & Xiaohui Wu & Jiale He & Zekun Zhou & Yulin Zhao, 2023. "Does Environmental Policy with Veto Power Lead to Heterogeneous Emission? Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(12), pages 1-19, June.
    3. Jiang, Qisheng & Tang, Pengcheng, 2023. "All roads lead to Rome? Carbon emissions, pollutant emissions and local officials’ political promotion in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).

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