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International Technology Transfers and Competition

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  • Eberhard Feess
  • Michael Hoeck
  • Oliver Lorz

Abstract

This paper analyzes North–South technology transfers in a model of oligopolistic competition and spatial product differentiation. Two firms in the North supply a high‐tech good and a technically related low‐tech good. They decide about licensing the low‐tech good to suppliers in the South. With the license Southern firms get access to technology from the North, which enables them—with a certain probability—to enter the market for the high‐tech good. Northern firms may therefore license strategically to influence the competitive environment in the high‐tech market. In this setting, multiple equilibria with and without licensing may arise, and the resulting outcomes may be inefficient from the viewpoint of the Northern firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Eberhard Feess & Michael Hoeck & Oliver Lorz, 2009. "International Technology Transfers and Competition," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 1038-1052, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:17:y:2009:i:5:p:1038-1052
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2009.00817.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leon Yang Chu & Yunzeng Wang, 2015. "Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition and Future Competition," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 17(2), pages 249-261, May.
    2. Jiyun Cao & Arijit Mukherjee, 2017. "Market Power of the Input Supplier, Technology Transfer and Consumer Welfare," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(4), pages 430-449, July.
    3. Pedro Mendi & Rafael Moner-Colonques & José J. Sempere-Monerris, 2016. "Optimal know-how transfers in licensing contracts," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(2), pages 121-139, June.
    4. Nakamura, Masao & Zhang, Anming, 2018. "Foreign direct investment with host country market structures, with empirical application to Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 43-53.
    5. Munirul H. Nabin & Xuan Nguyen & Pasquale M. Sgro, 2013. "Technology Transfer, Quality Standards, and North–South Trade," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 783-796, September.
    6. Xuan Nguyen & Pasquale Sgro & Munirul Nabin, 2017. "Optimal Licensing Policy under Vertical Product Differentiation," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 497-510, August.

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