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Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid

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  • Gil S. Epstein
  • Ira N. Gang

Abstract

International donors usually have particular goals they want to achieve with their foreign aid, e.g., poverty alleviation. In the international aid story lobbying by potential recipient groups attempting to capture the donor's support plays a potentially important role for non‐governmental organizations. We model this situation as a hierarchical contest and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process with non‐governmental organizations as intermediaries.

Suggested Citation

  • Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2006. "Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 285-296, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:285-296
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00318.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(4), pages 661-677, October.
    3. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The Politics of Randomness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 423-433, October.
    4. Richard Allard, 1988. "Rent-seeking with non-identical players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 3-14, April.
    5. repec:bla:econom:v:61:y:1994:i:241:p:79-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003. "Political culture and monopoly price determination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 1-19, August.
    7. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2002. "Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making," IZA Discussion Papers 547, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2000. "Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 285-296, June.
    9. Chau, Nancy H. & Huysentruyt, Marieke, 2006. "Nonprofits and public good provision: A contest based on compromises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(8), pages 1909-1935, November.
    10. Gradstein, Mark, 1994. "Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 877-897, November.
    11. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:bla:rdevec:v:13:y:2009:i:s1:p:382-392 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2016. "Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-101, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2019. "Taxation and social protection under governance decentralisation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2016. "Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization," WIDER Working Paper Series 101, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "The Hope for Hysteresis in Foreign Aid," Departmental Working Papers 200628, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    6. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2006. "Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2006-06, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Koch, Dirk-Jan & Dreher, Axel & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer, 2009. "Keeping a Low Profile: What Determines the Allocation of Aid by Non-Governmental Organizations?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 902-918, May.
    8. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2009. "Good governance and good aid allocation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 12-18, May.
    9. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2009. "Poverty and Governance: The Contest for Aid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 382-392, August.
    10. Nicola Banks & David Hulme, 2012. "The role of NGOs and civil society in development and poverty reduction," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series 17112, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    11. Banks, Nicola & Hulme, David & Edwards, Michael, 2015. "NGOs, States, and Donors Revisited: Still Too Close for Comfort?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 707-718.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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