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Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties

Author

Listed:
  • Gil S. Epstein

    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Ira N Gang

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.

Suggested Citation

  • Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties," Departmental Working Papers 200629, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200629
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    File URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2006-29.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George Mavrotas & Espen Villanger, 2006. "Multilateral Aid Agencies and Strategic Donor Behaviour," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2006-02, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2008. "Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 331-336, Springer.
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian L. Gale, 2008. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 337-345, Springer.
    4. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 447-453, June.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    6. Tore Ellingsen, 2008. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 399-408, Springer.
    7. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Effort and Performance in Public Policy Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 265-282, May.
    8. Jac C. Heckelman & Stephen Knack, 2008. "Foreign Aid and Market‐Liberalizing Reform," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 524-548, August.
    9. Mark McGillivray & Simon Feeny & Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink, 2005. "It Works; It Doesn't; It Can, But that Depends...: 50 Years of Controversy Over the Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2005-54, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2006. "Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 285-296, May.
    11. Epstein, Gil S., 2000. "Personal productivity and the likelihood of electoral success of political candidates," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 95-111, March.
    12. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "The Hope for Hysteresis in Foreign Aid," Departmental Working Papers 200628, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    foreign aid; rent seeking; governance; decentralization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid

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