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Inequality, good governance and endemic corruption

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  • Gil S. Epstein
  • Ira N. Gang

Abstract

Can a society suffering contests between rich and poor achieve good governance in the face of endemic corruption? We examine a stylized poor state with weak institutions in which a 'culture of evasion' damages state authority. Many evade tax payments, limiting the state's economic development capability. In the face of extensive corruption, it is challenging for the state to establish and implement policies reflecting good governance; for example, a government that is accountable and transparent, efficient and effective, and follows the rule of law.

Suggested Citation

  • Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2018. "Inequality, good governance and endemic corruption," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-19, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2018-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marwa Khouya & Abdelhay Benabdelhadi, 2020. "Good Governance And Its Impact On Economic Development: A Systematic Literature Review," Post-Print hal-04063762, HAL.
    2. Abdullah Almounsor & Sami Mensi, 2024. "The Relationship Between Financial Development, Institutions Quality, and Income Inequality from the Sub-Saharan Africa Countries," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(3), pages 14307-14338, September.
    3. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2024. "Herding, taxpayer's rent seeking and endemic corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 533-546.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Tax administration data; Governance; Rent-seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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