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The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy

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  • Dzmitry Bartalevich

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  • Dzmitry Bartalevich, 2016. "The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 267-283, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:54:y:2016:i:2:p:267-283
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jcms.12292
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nicola Giocoli, 2009. "Competition Versus Property Rights: American Antitrust Law, The Freiburg School, And The Early Years Of European Competition Policy," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 747-786.
    2. Coase, R H, 1993. "Law and Economics at Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 239-254, April.
    3. Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2005. "Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 829-848, December.
    4. Barak Y. Orbach, 2011. "The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 133-164.
    5. Jules Stuyck, 2005. "EC Competition Law After Modernisation: More than Ever in the Interest of Consumers," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-30, November.
    6. Stephen Wilks, 2009. "The Impact of the Recession on Competition Policy: Amending the Economic Constitution?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 269-288.
    7. Dennis W. Carlton, 2010. "Revising The Horizontal Merger Guidelines," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 619-652.
    8. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:45:y:2007:i::p:487-513 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:48:y:2010:i::p:111-132 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 32(2), pages 295-324, March.
    11. Alberto Pera, 2008. "Changing Views of Competition and EC Antitrust Law," Working Papers 13-2008, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Nov 2008.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2024. "Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale," Working Papers halshs-04604840, HAL.

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