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Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation

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  • Christina J. Schneider
  • Johannes Urpelainen

Abstract

This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. We argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments’ willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts. We test the theory against data on governments’ financial contributions to the European Development Fund. The empirical analyses robustly demonstrate that partisan heterogeneity reduces governments’ incentives to contribute to European cooperation on international development. On a more general level, we offer new perspective on the role of domestic politics in international cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Christina J. Schneider & Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. "Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 58(1), pages 120-142, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:58:y:2014:i:1:p:120-142
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    References listed on IDEAS

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