IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/revint/v1y2006i2p125-138.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Principal-agent problems in international organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Roland Vaubel

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Vaubel, 2006. "Principal-agent problems in international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 125-138, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:125-138
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-006-8340-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11558-006-8340-z
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11558-006-8340-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
    2. Richard L Cole & John Kincaid & Alejandro Rodriguez, 2004. "Public Opinion on Federalism and Federal Political Culture in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 2004," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 34(3), pages 201-221, Summer.
    3. Roland Vaubel & Axel Dreher & Uğurlu Soylu, 2007. "Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 275-295, December.
    4. Roland Vaubel, 2004. "Federation With Majority Decisions: Economic Lessons From The History Of The Unite D States, Germany And The European Union," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 53-59, December.
    5. Roland Vaubel, 1999. "Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 327-338, November.
    6. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
    7. Vaubel, Roland, 1994. "The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 151-190, October.
    8. repec:oup:ecpoli:v:17:y:2002:i:35:p:279-319 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Moesen, Wim & van Cauwenberge, Philippe, 2000. "The Status of the Budget Constraint, Federalism and the Relative Size of Government: A Bureaucracy Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(3-4), pages 207-224, September.
    10. Mark Schneider, 1989. "Intercity competition and the size of the local public work force," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 253-265, December.
    11. Bernhard Boockmann & Roland Vaubel, 2009. "The Theory of Raising Rivals’ Costs and Evidence from the International Labour Organisation," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(6), pages 862-887, June.
    12. Abdul G. Noury & Gérard Roland, 2002. "More power to the European Parliament? [‘Nice try: Should the Treaty of Nice be ratified’?]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 279-319.
    13. Brunner, Karl & Meltzer, Allan H., 1976. "Institutions, policies and economic performance," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-14, January.
    14. Fratianni, Michele & Pattison, John C., 1976. "The economics of the OECD," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 75-140, January.
    15. Frey, Bruno S., 1984. "The public choice view of international political economy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 199-223, January.
    16. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2004. "Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-22, January.
    17. Roland Vaubel, 1996. "Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank: A Comparison of the Evidence," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 195-210, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vaubel, Roland, 2003. "Principal-Agent-Probleme in internationalen Organisationen," HWWA Discussion Papers 219, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    2. repec:elg:eechap:15325_16 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Frank-Oliver Aldenhoff, 2007. "Are economic forecasts of the International Monetary Fund politically biased? A public choice analysis," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 239-260, September.
    4. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
    5. Roland Vaubel, 1986. "A public choice approach to international organization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 39-57, January.
    6. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2003. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," International Finance 0310004, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2004.
    7. Roland Vaubel & Axel Dreher & Uğurlu Soylu, 2007. "Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 275-295, December.
    8. Lars P. Feld & Horst Zimmermann & Thomas Döring, 2003. "Föderalismus, Dezentralität und Wirtschaftswachstum," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(3), pages 361-377.
    9. Geys, Benny & Konrad, Kai A., . "Federalism and optimal allocation across levels of governance," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    10. Fernando Albornoz & Antonio Cabrales, 2010. "Fiscal Centralization and the Political Process," Working Papers 2010-02, FEDEA.
    11. Pierre Salmon, 2006. "Horizontal Competition Among Governments," Chapters, in: Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio (ed.), Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September.
    13. Francesco Porcelli, 2014. "Electoral accountability and local government efficiency: quasi-experimental evidence from the Italian health care sector reforms," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 221-251, August.
    14. John Ashworth & Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Decentralization as a constraint to Leviathan: a panel cointegration analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 491-516, September.
    15. Lars P. Feld, 2006. "Regulatory Competition and Federalism in Switzerland: Diffusion by Horizontal and Vertical Interaction," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-22, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    16. François, Abel & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2021. "Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    17. Lars Feld, 2014. "James Buchanan’s theory of federalism: from fiscal equity to the ideal political order," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-252, September.
    18. Albert Breton & Heinrich Ursprung, 2002. "Globalization, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Henryk Kierzkowski (ed.), Europe and Globalization, chapter 13, pages 274-301, Palgrave Macmillan.
    19. Fortuna Casoria & Marianna Marino & Pierpaolo Parrotta & Davide Sala, 2019. "Local Government and Innovation: the case of Italian provinces," Working Papers halshs-02278092, HAL.
    20. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Emilie CALDEIRA, 2014. "La décentralisation dans les pays en développement : une revue de la littérature - Decentralization in developing countries: A literature review," Working Papers 201411, CERDI.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International organizations; Principal-agent problem;

    JEL classification:

    • H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:125-138. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.