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Looking beyond reelection: Revising assumptions about the factors motivating congressional behavior

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  • Glenn Parker

Abstract

This paper challenges the assumption inherent in most models of legislative behavior — namely that congressmen are driven by the desire for reelection. I offer an alternative perspective: incumbents seek to maximize their discretionary investments and the income generated by the job. The only constraint on this behavior is that legislators provide a satisfactory level of constituency service — a product that I suggest entails slight opportunity, and few manufacturing, costs for congressmen, and one that is unlikely to lose its value with increased production. I also demonstrate that increases in salary and discretionary investments have lengthened congressional careers. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

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  • Glenn Parker, 1989. "Looking beyond reelection: Revising assumptions about the factors motivating congressional behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 237-252, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:63:y:1989:i:3:p:237-252
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00138164
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-384, October.
    2. Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 656-675, September.
    3. Erikson, Robert S., 1972. "Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 1234-1245, December.
    4. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    5. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    6. Garand, James C. & Gross, Donald A., 1984. "Changes in the Vote Margins for Congressional Candidates: A Specification of Historical Trends," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 17-30, March.
    7. Tufte, Edward R., 1973. "The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 540-554, June.
    8. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
    9. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    10. Westefield, Louis P., 1974. "Majority Party Leadership and the Committee System in the House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 1593-1604, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Holcombe, 2009. "The social sub-optimality of competitive elections: comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 217-219, January.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:25:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Randall G. Holcombe, 1991. "Barriers to Entry and Political Competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(2), pages 231-240, April.
    4. Randall G. Holcombe & Jeffrey A. Mills, 1995. "Politics and Deficit Finance," Public Finance Review, , vol. 23(4), pages 448-466, October.
    5. Randall G. Holcombe & Jeffrey A. Mills, 1994. "Is Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform Revenue Neutral?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(1), pages 65-85, January.

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