Bail‐in rules and the pricing of Italian bank bonds
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DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12206
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Giorgia Simion & Elisa Cavezzali & Siva Nathan & Ugo Rigoni, 2020. "Market discipline on bank bond issues through the lens of a new forward‐looking measure of loan quality," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1350-1384, November.
- Vittoria Cerasi & Paola Galfrascoli, 2021. "Bail-in and Bank Funding Costs," Working Papers 472, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2021.
- Vittoria Cerasi & Stefano Montoli, 2020. "Bank resolution and multinational banks," Working Papers 447, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2020.
- Velliscig, Giulio & Floreani, Josanco & Polato, Maurizio, 2022. "How do bail-in amendments in Directive (EU) 2017/2399 affect the subordinated bond yields of EU G-SIBs?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 173-189.
- Martien Lamers & Thomas Present & Nicolas Soenen & Rudi Vander Vennet, 2023. "Does BRRD mitigate the bank-to-sovereign risk channel?," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 23/1060, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- Agnese, Paolo & Giacomini, Emanuela, 2023. "Bank's funding costs: Do ESG factors really matter?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
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