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Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance

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  • Hellwig, Martin

Abstract

The paper reviews and assesses our understanding of the notion of “market discipline†in corporate governance. It questions the wholesale appeal to this notion in policy discussion, which fails to provide an account of the underlying mechanisms in terms of theory and empirical analysis. Discipline that is provided by the “market†must be compared to discipline that is provided by other institutions, e.g., intermediaries acting as “delegated monitors†. The comparative assessment depends on (i) the information technology, (ii) the role of strategic interactions, and (iii) the disciplinary mechanism itself. Concerning (i), the question is whether the benefits of multiple sources of information exceed the costs. Concerning (ii), strategic interactions concern the free-rider problem in acquiring information that benefits all financiers, as well as distributive externalities involved in exploiting an information advantage to the detriment of other financiers. Concerning (iii), the question is whether investors have explicit intervention rights or whether “discipline†results from managerial acquiescence. As for the acquisition and aggregation of information in organized markets, positive welfare effects arise only if the information is put to productive use, either through improvements in real investment and managerial incentives, or through changes in corporate control. Necessary conditions for such benefits to arise are fairly restrictive, especially if the changes that occur are based on managerial acquiescence rather than the legal intervention rights of investors. The expansion of market-based managerial incentives in the nineties had little to do with these theoretical accounts. The experience of moral hazard that has accompanied this expansion, on the side of gate-keeping institutions as well as corporate management, confirms the predictions of theory about the potential for shortfalls in market discipline and the agency costs of equity finance through the open market.

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  • Hellwig, Martin, 2006. "Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 155, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:155
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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Champonnois, 2011. "The limits of market discipline: proprietary trading and aggregate risk," 2011 Meeting Papers 1013, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Florian Hett & Alexander Schmidt, 2013. "Bank Bailouts and Market Discipline: How Bailout Expectations Changed During the Financial Crisis," Working Papers 1305, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Aug 2013.
    3. Buck, Florian & Hildebrand, Nikolaus, 2014. "Elites and Bank-Based Finance: A political economy model on the emergence of financial systems," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100336, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Martin Hellwig, 2021. "‘Capitalism: what has gone wrong?’: Who went wrong? Capitalism? The market economy? Governments? ‘Neoliberal’ economics? [‘It Takes a Village to Maintain a Dangerous Financial System’, ch. 13]," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(4), pages 664-677.
    5. Hett, Florian & Schmidt, Alexander, 2017. "Bank rescues and bailout expectations: The erosion of market discipline during the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(3), pages 635-651.
    6. Fabrizio Crespi & Emanuela Giacomini & Danilo V. Mascia, 2019. "Bail‐in rules and the pricing of Italian bank bonds," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1321-1347, November.
    7. Bourgain, Arnaud & Pieretti, Patrice & Zanaj, Skerdilajda, 2012. "Financial openness, disclosure and bank risk-taking in MENA countries," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 283-300.
    8. Martin Hellwig, 2009. "Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(2), pages 129-207, June.
    9. König, Philipp Johann & Laux, Christian & Pothier, David, 2021. "The leverage effect of bank disclosures," Discussion Papers 31/2021, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    10. Freixas, Xavier & Laux, Christian, 2011. "Disclosure, transparency, and market discipline," CFS Working Paper Series 2011/11, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market Discipline; Financial Institutions; Information Processing; Corporate Governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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