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Quantifying structural subsidy values for systemically important financial institutions

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  • Ueda, Kenichi
  • Weder di Mauro, B.

Abstract

Claimants to Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) would receive transfers when governments are forced into bailouts. Ex ante, this bailout expectation lowers SIFIs’ daily funding costs. The funding cost advantage reflects both the structural level of the government support and the time-varying market valuation for such a support. Based on a large worldwide sample of banks, we estimate the value of the structural subsidy, by exploiting expectations of state support embedded in credit ratings and by applying the long-run average value of the rating bonus. The value of the structural subsidy was already sizable, 60basis points (bp), as of the end-2007, before the crisis. It increased to 80bp by the end-2009.

Suggested Citation

  • Ueda, Kenichi & Weder di Mauro, B., 2013. "Quantifying structural subsidy values for systemically important financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 3830-3842.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:10:p:3830-3842
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.05.019
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Systemically important financial institutions; Bank funding subsidy; Bank bailout;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

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