The Care And Handling Of Monetary Authorities
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00021.x
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
- Gabillon, Emmanuelle & Martimort, David, 2004.
"The benefits of central bank's political independence,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 353-378, April.
- Gabillon, E. & Martimort, D., 1999. "The Benefits of Central Bank's Political Independence," Papers 99.528, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Emmanuelle Gabillon & David Martimort, 2004. "The benefits of central bank's political independence," Post-Print hal-00167817, HAL.
- Giannini, Curzio, 1995. "Money, trust, and central banking," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 217-237, May.
- Jon Faust, 1992. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," International Finance Discussion Papers 429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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