Dynamic games in organization theory
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- Radner, Roy, 1989. "Dynamic Games in Organization Theory," Working Paper Series 228, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised Feb 1991.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Garvey, Gerald T., 1995. "Why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration A simple model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 387-397, December.
- Aditya U. Kulkarni & Christian Wernz, 2020. "Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 307-329, May.
- Brock, William A. & Evans, Lewis T., 1996. "Principal-agent contracts in continuous time asymmetric information models the importance of large continuing information flows," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 523-535, May.
- Morasch, Karl, 1995. "Moral hazard and optimal contract form for R&D cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 63-78, September.
- Prajit Dutta & Roy Radner, 2006. "Population growth and technological change in a global warming model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 251-270, October.
- Dasgupta, Sudipto & Tao, Zhigang, 1998. "Contractual incompleteness and the optimality of equity joint ventures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 391-413, December.
- Pilar Socorro, M., 2007. "Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 76-97, January.
- M. Pilar Socorro, 2003. "Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 570.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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