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Resource allocation at an income‐sharing community: An application of Elinor Ostrom's commons framework

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  • Nazli Azergun

Abstract

Elinor Ostrom's framework for commons management is used here to analyse ethnographic material from long‐term fieldwork in an income‐sharing community in the United States. By requiring participants to pool labour and share resources for survival and well‐being, income‐sharing communities align with Ostrom's allocation design for common‐pool resources. These communities can figure as a node within the hybrid and polycentric networks designated by Ostrom for equitable and effective commons management, which requires both effective institutional arrangements and shared social capital among system participants. While a case is made for analysing resource‐sharing practices at these communities with Elinor Ostrom's framework, shortcomings and possible future directions are indicated.

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  • Nazli Azergun, 2020. "Resource allocation at an income‐sharing community: An application of Elinor Ostrom's commons framework," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 367-384, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:40:y:2020:i:3:p:367-384
    DOI: 10.1111/ecaf.12423
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