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Electoral Rules And Public Spending Composition: The Case Of Italian Regions

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  • Raffaella Santolini

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  • Raffaella Santolini, 2017. "Electoral Rules And Public Spending Composition: The Case Of Italian Regions," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 551-577, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:35:y:2017:i:3:p:551-577
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    1. Pessino, Carola & Izquierdo, Alejandro & Vuletin, Guillermo, 2018. "Better Spending for Better Lives: How Latin America and the Caribbean Can Do More with Less," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 9152, November.

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