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Arend Lijphart's Dimensions of Democracy: Logical Connections and Institutional Design

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  • Rein Taagepera

Abstract

Lijphart's (1999) analysis maps countries along two dimensions of democratic institutions: ‘executives‐parties’ or ‘joint‐power’, and ‘federal‐unitary’ or ‘divided‐power’. My ‘meta‐study’ maps the methodology of Lijphart's mapping: the nature of indices (inputs or outputs), their logical interconnections, their susceptibility to institutional design (‘constitutional engineering’), and their suitability for expressing the intended underlying concepts. Strikingly, the joint‐power indicators are highly correlated and mostly logically connected output measures, which are not susceptible to institutional design, while the opposite is true for the divided‐power dimension. For this dimension most indices are expert estimates of inputs, marginally correlated, yet subject to institutional design, limited by size dependence. Surprisingly, the parliamentary‐presidential aspect of institutional design does not affect the picture. The connection between cabinet life and the number of parties is even stronger than found by Lijphart. Interest groups and central bank independence fit his dimensions empirically but less so logically. In sum, institutional design may be more difficult than sometimes assumed, but offers hope.

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  • Rein Taagepera, 2003. "Arend Lijphart's Dimensions of Democracy: Logical Connections and Institutional Design," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 51(1), pages 1-19, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:51:y:2003:i:1:p:1-19
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00409
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    1. Goodin, Robert E., 1996. "Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and Beyond," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(2), pages 331-343, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Raffaella Santolini, 2017. "Electoral Rules And Public Spending Composition: The Case Of Italian Regions," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 551-577, July.
    2. Simon Hix & Christophe Crombez, 2005. "Extracting Ideal Point Estimates from Actors’ Preferences in the EU Constitutional Negotiations," European Union Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 353-376, September.
    3. Raffaella SANTOLINI, 2013. "Electoral rules and public expenditure composition: Evidence from Italian regions," Working Papers 396, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    4. Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-21, March.
    5. Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)," Economics Working Papers 812, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    6. Adrian Vatter & Julian Bernauer, 2009. "The Missing Dimension of Democracy," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(3), pages 335-359, September.

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