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Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics

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  • Dixit, Avinash
  • Londregan, John

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  • Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:68:y:1998:i:2:p:153-180
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 856-869, December.
    2. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    3. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1995. "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 856-866, December.
    4. Roger H. Gordon, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 567-586.
    5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-646, May.
    6. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529.
    7. Stokes, Donald E., 1963. "Spatial Models of Party Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 368-377, June.
    8. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    9. Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June.
    10. Starrett, David A, 1980. "Measuring Externalities and Second Best Distortions in the Theory of Local Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(3), pages 627-642, April.
    11. James M. Snyder, 1994. "Safe Seats, Marginal Seats, And Party Platforms: The Logic Of Platform Differentiation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 201-213, November.
    12. Alan Williams, 1966. "The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(1), pages 18-33.
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