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Governance Structure, Managerial Characteristics, and Firm Performance in the Deregulated Rail Industry

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  • Ann F. Friedlaender

    (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

  • Ernst R. Berndt

    (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

  • Gerard McCullough

    (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Ann F. Friedlaender & Ernst R. Berndt & Gerard McCullough, 1992. "Governance Structure, Managerial Characteristics, and Firm Performance in the Deregulated Rail Industry," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 23(1992 Micr), pages 95-186.
    • Handle: RePEc:bin:bpeajo:v:23:y:1992:i:1992-3:p:95-186
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    File URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1992/01/1992_bpeamicro_friedlaender.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
    2. Scherer, F M, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 69-82, Winter.
    3. Winston, Clifford, 1985. "Conceptual Development in the Economics of Transportation: An Interpretive Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 57-94, March.
    4. Sam Peltzman, 1989. "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989 Micr), pages 1-59.
    5. McFarland, Henry, 1987. "Did Railroad Deregulation Lead to Monopoly Pricing? An Application of q," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(3), pages 385-400, July.
    6. John M. Abowd, 1990. "Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 52, April.
    7. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    8. Kenneth D. Boyer, 1987. "The Costs of Price Regulation: Lessons from Railroad Deregulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 408-416, Autumn.
    9. Jarrell, Gregg A & Brickley, James A & Netter, Jeffry M, 1988. "The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 49-68, Winter.
    10. Jensen, Michael C, 1988. "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 21-48, Winter.
    11. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 7-20, Winter.
    12. Richard C. Levin, 1981. "Railroad Rates, Profitability, and Welfare Under Deregulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    13. Berndt, Ernst R. & Fuss, Melvyn A., 1986. "Productivity measurement with adjustments for variations in capacity utilization and other forms of temporary equilibrium," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 7-29.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc., 1999. "The Privatization of New Zealand Rail Part 1: Assessment of History Markets and Data," Working Paper Series 3923, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    2. Felipe Aldunate, 2018. "Firm Competition and CEO Turnover: Evidence from US Railroad Deregulation," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 451-476, June.
    3. NZ Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc, 1999. "The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail," Treasury Working Paper Series 99/10, New Zealand Treasury.
    4. Coublucq Daniel & Ivaldi Marc & McCullough Gerard, 2018. "The Static-Dynamic Efficiency Trade-off in the US Rail Freight Industry: Assessment of an Open Access Policy," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(4), pages 267-301, December.
    5. Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L. & Shepard, Andrea., 1993. "Regulatory constraints on executive compensation," Working papers 3550-93., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    6. James M. MacDonald & Linda C. Cavalluzzo, 1996. "Railroad Deregulation: Pricing Reforms, Shipper Responses, and the Effects on Labor," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(1), pages 80-91, October.
    7. Quigley, Neil & Evans, Lewis, 1998. "Common Elements in the Governance of Deregulated Electricity Markets, Telecommunications Market and Payment Systems," Working Paper Series 3938, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    8. Laura Padilla-Angulo, 2020. "The impact of board diversity on strategic change: a stakeholder perspective," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(4), pages 927-952, December.
    9. Siew Hoon Lim & C.A. Knox Lovell, 2009. "Profit and productivity of US Class I railroads," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(7), pages 423-442.
    10. Coublucq, Daniel, 2013. "Econometric analysis of productivity with measurement error: Empirical application to the US Railroad industry," DICE Discussion Papers 95, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    11. Christopher A. Vellturo & Ernst R. Berndt & Ann F. Friedlaender & Judy Shaw‐Er Wang Chiang & Mark H. Showalter, 1992. "Deregulation, Mergers, and Cost Savingsin Class I U.S. Railroads, 1974‐1986," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 339-369, June.
    12. Laura Padilla-Angulo & Guido Friebel & Gerard McCullough, 2019. "Product Market Deregulation's Winners and Losers: US Railroads Between 1981 and 2001," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 53(3), pages 212-21-237.
    13. Coublucq, Daniel, 2013. "Demand estimation with selection bias: A dynamic game approach with an application to the US railroad industry," DICE Discussion Papers 94, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    14. The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc., 1999. "The Privatization of New Zealand Rail Part 2: Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis," Working Paper Series 3925, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.

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