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Testing Behaviors in the Play of an Expected Prisoner's Dilemma

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  • Richard Arend

    (University of Southern Maine)

Abstract

We test the impact of a new form of game structure – the expected game – focusing on whether it improves the outcomes of a prisoner’s dilemma. An expected game is defined by the probability-weighted payoffs of two or more different reference or ‘bookend’ games. We analyze the impact of this structure and several relevant variants through a set of human subject-based experiments on non-na ̈ıve, consenting participants. As conjectured, we find that real play under this structure does decrease defection in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game. Additionally, we find that such effects can be enhanced through framing and priming treatments. We discuss the micro-economic policy implications of our new results.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Arend, 2023. "Testing Behaviors in the Play of an Expected Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 7(1), pages 25-33, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:beh:jbepv1:v:7:y:2023:i:1:p:25-33
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    implied games; expected payoffs; prisoner's dilemma; microeconomic policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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