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Career Concerns, Contracts, and Effort Distortions

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  • Fredrik Andersson

    (Lund University)

Abstract

A two-period, career-concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker's ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.

Suggested Citation

  • Fredrik Andersson, 2002. "Career Concerns, Contracts, and Effort Distortions," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 42-58, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:20:y:2002:i:1:p:42-58
    DOI: 10.1086/323931
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1995. "Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 257-273, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meagher, Kieron & Prasad, Suraj, 2016. "Career concerns and team talent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 1-17.
    2. Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2016. "Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 581-620.
    3. Dr. Nasser Fegh-hi Farahmand, 2013. "Teaching Strategy as Excellence Organization Mission," Indian Journal of Commerce and Management Studies, Educational Research Multimedia & Publications,India, vol. 4(2), pages 16-28, May.
    4. Bilanakos, Christos, 2013. "Career concerns and firm – sponsored general training," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 117-132.
    5. Pedro Ortín‐Ángel & Vicente Salas‐Fumás, 2007. "Compensation Dispersion Between and Within Hierarchical Levels," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 53-79, March.
    6. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2006. "Career concerns in a simple experimental labour market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 147-170, January.
    7. Michael Schwarz & Sergei Severinov, 2010. "Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(4), pages 893-922, October.
    8. Tsung-Sheng Tsai & Yasunari Tamada, 2004. "Allocation of Decision-Making Authority with Principal's Reputation Concerns," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 701, Econometric Society.
    9. Peter Bardsley & Nisvan Erkal & Nikos Nikiforakis & Tom Wilkening, 2011. "Recursive Contracts, Firm Longevity, and Rat Races: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1122, The University of Melbourne, revised 2011.
    10. Cici, Gjergji & Hendriock, Mario & Kempf, Alexander, 2021. "The impact of labor mobility restrictions on managerial actions: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    11. Cici, Gjergji & Hendriock, Mario & Kempf, Alexander, 2018. "The impact of labor mobility restrictions on managerial actions: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 18-01, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    12. Michael Schwarz & Sergei Severinov, 2009. "Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?," NBER Working Papers 15136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. BÃ¥rd Harstad, 2007. "Organizational Form and the Market for Talent," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(3), pages 581-611.
    14. Kim, Doyoung, 2017. "Motivating for new changes when agents have reputation concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 37-53.
    15. Bardsley, Peter & Erkal, Nisvan & Nikiforakis, Nikos & Wilkening, Tom, 2013. "Recursive contracts, firm longevity, and rat races: An experimental analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 217-231.

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