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Screening for collusion: Evidences from the Indian cement industry

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  • Bejger, Sylwester

Abstract

The paper is devoted to evaluation of the econometric method applied as a part of a variance screen in collusion detection procedure. Validation is based on ex-post analysis of Indian cement industry in the 1994 - 2009 time period and comparative study of the obtained results with factual evidences of collusion at that market. The method in question is based on MS(M)AR (p, q) Markov switching model specification. As a result of the research we could identify variability regimes consistent with theoretical motivation of the marker and detect collusion and competition phases partly consistent with historical evidences. However promising, method had some drawbacks applied to high frequency data in the context of variance screen. We proposed some solutions for further research to overcome it.

Suggested Citation

  • Bejger, Sylwester, 2015. "Screening for collusion: Evidences from the Indian cement industry," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center (PRADEC), vol. 11(2), pages 1-19.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:pdcbeh:246153
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.246153
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bejger, Sylwester, 2012. "Cartel in the Indian cement industry: An attempt to identify it," Economics Discussion Papers 2012-18, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    5. Blanckenburg Korbinian von & Kholodilin Konstantin A. & Geist Alexander, 2012. "The Influence of Collusion on Price Changes: New Evidence from Major Cartel Cases," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 245-256, August.
    6. Russo,Francesco & Schinkel,Maarten Pieter & Günster,Andrea & Carree,Martin, 2011. "European Commission Decisions on Competition," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521295642, January.
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    9. repec:kap:iaecre:v:15:y:2009:i:4:p:421-436 is not listed on IDEAS
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