The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges
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- Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2011. "The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-35, CIRANO.
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Cited by:
- Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2015.
"How Much Do Cartel Overcharge?,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(2), pages 119-153, September.
- Boyer, Marcel & Kotchoni, Rachidi, 2014. "How Much Do Cartels Overcharge?," TSE Working Papers 14-462, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2015.
- Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2015. "How Much Do Cartels Overcharge," Post-Print hal-01386061, HAL.
- John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, 2017. "Comment on “The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, and Remedies”," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 329-338, September.
- Salvatore Piccolo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2014. "Debt, Managers and Cartels," CSEF Working Papers 365, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2015.
"Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on price overcharge,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 70-80.
- Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph, 2014. "Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-129/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2014. "Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-15, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Vasiliki Bageri & Yannis Katsoulacos, 2023. "Measuring the effects of information exchange on incentives to collude using calibrated simulations (with an example of the South African oil industry)," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(4), pages 1846-1875, June.
- Stephen Davies & Peter Ormosi, 2013. "The Impact of Competition Policy: What are the Known Unknowns?," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-07, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Marie-Laure Allain & Marcel Boyer & Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2011.
"The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases - The Myth of Underdeterrence,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2011s-34, CIRANO.
- Marie-Laure Allain & Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2011. "The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases The Myth of Underdeterrence," Working Papers hal-00631432, HAL.
- Shastitko, Andrey (Шаститко, Андрей) & Golovanova, Svetlana (Голованова, Светлана), 2015. "'Comparable Markets' as a Tool of Antitrust Policy: Design, Application Experience, Development Directions [«Сопоставимые Рынки» Как Инструмент Антимонопольной Политики: Дизайн, Опыт Применения, На," Published Papers mn31, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
- Piccolo, Salvatore & Pignataro, Aldo, 2018. "Consumer loss aversion, product experimentation and tacit collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 49-77.
- Iwan Bos & Stephen Davies & Peter L. Ormosi, 2014. "The deterrent effect of anti-cartel enforcement: A tale of two tails," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2014-06v2, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Panayiotis Agisilaou, 2013. "Collusion in Industrial Economics and Optimally Designed Leniency Programmes - A Survey," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-03, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2015.
"Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on price overcharge,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 70-80.
- Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph, 2014. "Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-129/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph, 2014. "Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201413, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.
- Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2014. "Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-15, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2015. "How Much Do Cartel Overcharge? (The "Working Paper" Version)," CIRANO Working Papers 2015s-37, CIRANO.
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