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A Group Incentive Contract To Promote Adoption Of Best Management Practices

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  • DeVuyst, Eric A.
  • Ipe, Viju C.

Abstract

The control of agricultural nonpoint source pollution is emerging as a priority of state and national pollution control programs. Best management practices (BMPs) are often proposed as a method of control. Many BMPs are perceived by farmers as having economic disadvantages when compared to conventional management systems. In the absence of tougher environmental restrictions on farmer behavior and complete observability of individual farmer actions, it may be necessary to provide economic incentives to encourage farmer adoption of BMPs within environmentally sensitive watersheds. This study investigates the use of a group incentive contract to encourage adoption of BMPs. The idea behind the group incentive contract is to compensate farmers for actual damages due to adoption of BMPs while avoiding moral hazard problems and exploiting the correlated risks that farmers in a watershed face. Simulation results indicate that the majority of the nitrate pollution generated by central Illinois corn growers could eliminated at little or no cost.

Suggested Citation

  • DeVuyst, Eric A. & Ipe, Viju C., 1999. "A Group Incentive Contract To Promote Adoption Of Best Management Practices," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 1-16, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:30803
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30803
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gottshall, Bryan & Paudel, Krishna P., 2013. "Assessing the Efficiency of Alternative Best Management Practices to Reduce Nonpoint Source Pollution in the Broiler Production Region of Louisiana," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150463, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. Edith Kouakou & Marielle Brunette & Richard Koenig & Philippe Delacote, 2023. "Crop Yield Risks and Nitrogen Fertilisation in French Agriculture: Implications for Crop Insurance," Working Papers of BETA 2023-38, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    3. Ipe, Viju C. & DeVuyst, Eric A. & Braden, John B. & White, David C., 2001. "Simulation Of A Group Incentive Program For Farmer Adoption Of Best Management Practices," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 1-12, October.
    4. Paudel, Krishna P. & Gauthier, Wayne M. & Westra, John V. & Hall, Larry M., 2008. "Factors Influencing and Steps Leading to the Adoption of Best Management Practices by Louisiana Dairy Farmers," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 40(1), pages 1-20, April.
    5. Wu, Qianni & Chiu, Chun-Hung, 2023. "The impacts of carbon insurance on supply chain and environment considering technology risk under cap-and-trade mechanism," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    6. Traxler, Emilia & Li, Tongzhe, 2020. "Agricultural Best Management Practices, A summary of adoption behaviour," Working Papers 305271, University of Guelph, Institute for the Advanced Study of Food and Agricultural Policy.
    7. Ipe, Viju C. & DeVuyst, Eric A., 1999. "A Group Incentive Program For Farmer Adoption Of Best Management Practices: An Application To The Nitrate Pollution Problem In Central Illinois," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21704, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Paudel, Krishna P. & Gauthier, Wayne M. & Hall, Larry M. & Westra, John V., 2006. "Willingness to Participate in Dairy Programs to Reduce Manure Related Problems in Louisiana's Major Dairy Production Region," 2006 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2006, Orlando, Florida 35259, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    9. Meilin Ma & Carson Reeling & Megan N Hughes & Shalamar Armstrong & Richard Roth, 2023. "Comparison of conservation instruments under long-run yield uncertainty and farmer risk aversion," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 50(5), pages 1685-1714.
    10. Obubuafo, Joyce & Gillespie, Jeffrey M. & Paudel, Krishna P. & Kim, Seon-Ae, 2006. "Knowledge, Application and Adoption of Best Management Practices by Cattle Farmers under the Environmental Quality Incentives Program - A Sequential Analysis," 2006 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2006, Orlando, Florida 35307, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.

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