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Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities

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  • Katrin Millock

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Angels Xabadia

    (Department of Economics - UdG - Universitat de Girona = University of Girona)

  • David Zilberman

    (ARE - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics [Berkeley] - UC Berkeley - University of California [Berkeley] - UC - University of California)

Abstract

With the development of modern information technologies, relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing, a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers, consumers or travelers - road pricing schemes or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples. In the paper, we analyze a dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agent. The paper's contribution is to explicitly study a decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time. Each agent has to choose between paying a fixed fee or installing monitoring technology and paying a tax on actual emissions. We determine the second-best tax rates, the pattern of monitoring technology adoption, and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring technologies over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Katrin Millock & Angels Xabadia & David Zilberman, 2009. "Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities," Post-Print halshs-00367888, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00367888
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00367888
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    1. Renan-Ulrich Goetz & Yolanda Martínez, 2013. "Nonpoint source pollution and two-part instruments," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(3), pages 237-258, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Externalities; environmental taxation; monitoring technology adoption; diffusion; nanotechnologies; Externalités; taxe environnementale; adoption de technologies de mesure; nano-technologies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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