Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings
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- Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
- José Santiago Arroyo Mina, 2012. "Dilemas sociales de la pesca en el pacífico colombiano: un análisis desde la teoría de juegos," Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, June.
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