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State Censorship

Author

Listed:
  • Mehdi Shadmehr
  • Dan Bernhardt

Abstract

We characterize a ruler's decision of whether to censor media reports that convey information to citizens who decide whether to revolt. We find: (i) a ruler gains (his ex ante expected payoff increases) by committing to censoring slightly less than he does in equilibrium: his equilibrium calculations ignore that censoring less causes citizens to update more positively following no news; (ii) a ruler gains from higher censorship costs if and only if censorship costs exceed a critical threshold; (iii) a bad ruler prefers a very strong media to a very weak one, but a good ruler prefers the opposite. (JEL D72, D74, D83)

Suggested Citation

  • Mehdi Shadmehr & Dan Bernhardt, 2015. "State Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 280-307, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:2:p:280-307
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130221
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 506-560, May.
    2. Gabriele Gratton & Barton E Lee, 2024. "Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(1), pages 340-371.
    3. Rafkin, Charlie & Shreekumar, Advik & Vautrey, Pierre-Luc, 2021. "When guidance changes: Government stances and public beliefs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    4. Ahnert, Toni & Bertsch, Christoph, 2013. "A wake-up call: information contagion and strategic uncertainty," Working Paper Series 282, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), revised 01 Mar 2014.
    5. Little, Andrew T., 2017. "Propaganda and credulity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 224-232.
    6. Shadmehr, Mehdi & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Vanguards in revolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 146-166.
    7. Marcel Caesmann & Janis Goldzycher & Matteo Grigoletto & Lorenz Gschwent, 2024. "Censorship in democracy," ECON - Working Papers 446, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    8. Joan Barceló & Robert Kubinec & Cindy Cheng & Tiril Høye Rahn & Luca Messerschmidt, 2022. "Windows of repression: Using COVID-19 policies against political dissidents?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(1), pages 73-89, January.
    9. Edmond, Chris & Lu, Yang K., 2021. "Creating confusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    10. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2020. "Reputation and news suppression in the media industry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 240-271.
    11. Matt Malis & Alastair Smith, 2019. "A global game of diplomacy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 480-506, October.
    12. Toni Ahnert & Christoph Bertsch, 2022. "A Wake-Up Call Theory of Contagion [Asymmetric business cycles: theory and time-series evidence]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 26(4), pages 829-854.
    13. Corduneanu Huci,Cristina & Hamilton,Alexander James, 2018. "Selective control : the political economy of censorship," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8556, The World Bank.
    14. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
    15. Guriev, Sergei & Treisman, Daniel, 2020. "A theory of informational autocracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    16. Shadmehr, Mehdi, 2015. "Extremism in revolutionary movements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 97-121.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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