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Contractual Models of the Labor Market

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  • Holmstrom, Bengt

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  • Holmstrom, Bengt, 1981. "Contractual Models of the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 308-313, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:71:y:1981:i:2:p:308-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon, Robert J., 1976. "Recent developments in the theory of inflation and unemployment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 185-219, April.
    2. Martin Neil Baily, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50.
    3. Radner, Roy, 1972. "Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(2), pages 289-303, March.
    4. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, 1999. "Age Discrimination Laws and Labor Market Efficiency," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1081-1110, October.
    2. Gutierrez, Federico H., 2014. "Acute morbidity and labor outcomes in Mexico: Testing the role of labor contracts as an income smoothing mechanism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-12.
    3. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    4. Alan Benson & Aaron Sojourner & Akhmed Umyarov, 2020. "Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1802-1825, May.
    5. Schöttner, Anja, 2005. "Relational contracts and job design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2005-052, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    6. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2005-052 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Joan E. Ricarti Costa, 1984. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Discussion Papers 595S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Robert H. Topel & Finis Welch, 1986. "Efficient Labor Contracts with Employment Risk," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 490-507, Winter.
    9. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. David Neumark, 2003. "Age Discrimination Legislation in the United States," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(3), pages 297-317, July.
    11. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
    12. Kátay, Gábor, 2008. "Do firms provide wage insurance against shocks? Evidence from Hungary," Working Paper Series 964, European Central Bank.
    13. Doh-Shin Jeon & Joel Shapiro, 2004. "Downsizing, job insecurity and firm reputation," Economics Working Papers 795, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    14. Miguel Portela & Ana Rute Cardoso, 2005. "The provision of wage insurance by the firm: evidence from a longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset," NIPE Working Papers 17/2005, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    15. Ana Rute Cardoso & Miguel Portela, 2009. "Micro Foundations for Wage Flexibility: Wage Insurance at the Firm Level," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 29-50, March.
    16. Kragl, Jenny & Schmid, Julia, 2009. "The impact of envy on relational employment contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 766-779, November.
    17. Wulf, Julie, 2009. "Influence and inefficiency in the internal capital market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 305-321, October.
    18. Kragl, Jenny & Schmid, Julia, 2006. "Relational contracts and inequity aversion," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-085, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    19. Rosen, Sherwin, 1983. "Unemployment and insurance," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 5-49, January.
    20. Huang, Pinghsun & Huang, Hsin-Yi & Zhang, Yan, 2019. "Do firms hedge with foreign currency derivatives for employees?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(2), pages 418-440.
    21. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
    22. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2006-085 is not listed on IDEAS

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