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Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions

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  • Joan E. Ricarti Costa

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  • Joan E. Ricarti Costa, 1984. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Discussion Papers 595S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:595s
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/595.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-1797, November.
    2. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    3. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-620, September.
    4. Hajime Miyazaki, 1977. "The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 394-418, Autumn.
    5. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    6. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    7. James L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, 1980. "Experience, Performance, and Earnings," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 95(4), pages 703-736.
    8. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    9. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1980. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," Discussion Papers 414R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
    12. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1981. "Contractual Models of the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 308-313, May.
    13. Prescott, Edward C & Visscher, Michael, 1980. "Organization Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 446-461, June.
    14. Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, 1986. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(4), pages 835-860.
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    Cited by:

    1. Waldman, Michael, 1989. "Information on worker ability : An analysis of investment within the firm," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 57-80.

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