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Franchising als Mischsystem: Die Bestimmung des optimalen Anteils der franchisenehmerbetriebenen Einheiten am Gesamtsystem

Author

Listed:
  • Thorsten Posselt

    (Universität Wuppertal)

  • Thomas Bürkle

    (J.W. Goethe-Universität)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Die meisten Franchisesysteme verfügen über franchisenehmereigene und franchisegebereigene Einheiten (letztere entsprechen Niederlassungen). Dies ist zunächst überraschend, weil entweder die vom Franchisenehmer oder die vom Franchisegeber geführten Einheiten effizienter sein müssten. Man sollte daher reine Systeme, nicht aber Mischsysteme erwarten. Wir untersuchen zunächst verschiedene Erklärungen für die Existenz von Mischsystemen, die allerdings keinen Hinweis auf die optimale Mischung von franchisenehmer- und franchisegebergeführten Einheiten geben. Darauf aufbauend entwickeln wir dann ein Modell zur optimalen Risikoallokation aus Sicht des Franchisegebers, welches die optimale Mischung in Systemen erklärt. Der optimale Anteil an Franchisenehmern an der Gesamtzahl der Systemeinheiten hängt ab von den Risikokosten des Franchisegebers und von seinen Kontrollkosten. Wir zeigen, dass der Anreiz für Franchisegeber, weitere Einheiten an Franchisenehmer zu vergeben und nicht selbst zu führen, mit zunehmendem Anteil der Franchisenehmer und mit rückläufigen Kontroll kosten abnimmt.

Suggested Citation

  • Thorsten Posselt & Thomas Bürkle, 2006. "Franchising als Mischsystem: Die Bestimmung des optimalen Anteils der franchisenehmerbetriebenen Einheiten am Gesamtsystem," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 150-168, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:58:y:2006:i:2:d:10.1007_bf03371648
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371648
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D81; M31;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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