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External influences on economic reform: Reform as a regional public good

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  • Grier, Kevin
  • Sutter, Daniel

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  • Grier, Kevin & Sutter, Daniel, 2007. "External influences on economic reform: Reform as a regional public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 660-673, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:3:p:660-673
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    1. Chang, Roberto, 2001. "Commitment, coordination failures, and delayed reforms," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 123-144, February.
    2. Bartolini, Leonardo & Drazen, Allan, 1997. "Capital-Account Liberalization as a Signal," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 138-154, March.
    3. Vila, Jean-Luc & Zariphopoulou, Thaleia, 1997. "Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Choice with Borrowing Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 402-431, December.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    5. George M. Constantinides & John B. Donaldson & Rajnish Mehra, 2002. "Junior Can't Borrow: A New Perspective on the Equity Premium Puzzle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 269-296.
    6. Kuran, Timur, 1987. "Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 642-665, September.
    7. Casella, Alessandra & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilisation?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 605-619, May.
    8. Biederman, Daniel K., 2000. "Borrowing Constraints and Individual Welfare in a Neoclassical Growth Model," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 645-670, October.
    9. Bartolini, Leonardo & Drazen, Allan, 1997. "When liberal policies reflect external shocks, what do we learn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-4), pages 249-273, May.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    11. Orphanides, Athanasios, 1996. "The timing of stabilizations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-3), pages 257-279.
    12. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
    13. Zhang, Harold H, 1997. "Endogenous Borrowing Constraints with Incomplete Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 2187-2209, December.
    14. Levine, David K. & Martinelli, Cesar, 1998. "Reputation with Noisy Precommitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 55-75, January.
    15. Jim Leitzel & Erik Weisman, 1999. "Investing in Policy Reform," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(4), pages 696-696, December.
    16. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    17. Siu Fai Leung, 2000. "Why Do Some Households Save So Little? A Rational Explanation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 771-800, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Agnello, Luca & Castro, Vitor & Jalles, João Tovar & Sousa, Ricardo M., 2015. "What determines the likelihood of structural reforms?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 129-145.

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