IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v200y2024i1d10.1007_s11127-024-01148-2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Conflict under the shadow of elections

Author

Listed:
  • Antonis Adam

    (University of Ioannina
    Hellenic Open University)

  • Maxime Menuet

    (Université Côte d’Azur
    IPAG Business School
    Chaire d’Economie de Défense)

  • Petros G. Sekeris

    (TBS Business School)

Abstract

In this article we study whether an elected leader has incentives to withdraw from an ongoing military conflict before elections take place. Remaining active in the conflict increases the chances of a victory, which would boost the political incumbent’s reelection probability. On the other hand, if the rival does not surrender, then the incumbent politician’s reelection probability decreases because of the costly conflict citizens have to endure. We show that when the crisis is costly to voters, the more distant the elections are, the more likely the ruling government withdraws from an ongoing war early. For low-cost conflicts, politicians never give up the fighting. We also show that confrontations in the shadow of elections are socially inefficient (too long or too short) because of the inherent misalignment of preferences between citizens and politicians.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonis Adam & Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2024. "Conflict under the shadow of elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 173-199, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:200:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01148-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01148-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-024-01148-2
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-024-01148-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Conflict; War of attrition; Political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:200:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01148-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.