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Content
2017
- 291 Rationalizability of the Nash bargaining solution
by Trockel, Walter
- 290 Single peakedness and coalition proofness
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter
- 288 The complexity of a number as a quantitative predictor of the frequency of responses under decimal perception
by Albers, Wulf
- 287 A model of the concession behavior in the sequence of offers of the German electronic stock exchange trading market (IBIS) based on the prominence structure of the bid ask spread
by Albers, Wulf & Uphaus, Andreas & Vogt, Bodo
- 286 The boundedly rational decision process creating probability responses empirical results confirming the theory of prominence
by Albers, Wulf & Güntzel, Andreas
- 285 Cash equivalent versus market value
by Albers, Wulf
- 284 Evaluation of lotteries with two alternatives by the theory of prominence
by Albers, Wulf
- 283 Connection between ultimatum behavior and reciprocity in a combined ultimatum reciprocity game
by Vogt, Bodo
- 282 The price response function and logarithmic perception of prices and quantities
by Fegel, Fred & Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf
- 281 Criteria for fair divisions in ultimatum games
by Vogt, Bodo
- 280 Stock price clustering and numerical perception
by Uphaus, Andreas & Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf
- 279 The strength of reciprocity in a reciprocity game
by Vogt, Bodo
- 278 Reference functions and solutions to bargaining problems with claims
by Gerber, Anke
- 277 The averaging mechanism
by Naeve-Steinweg, Elisabeth
- 276 The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable
by Naeve, Jörg
- 275 On the value of discounted stochastic games
by Coulomb, Jean-Michel
- 274 Environmental taxation and the double dividend: a drawback for a revenue-neutral tax reform
by Bayındır-Upmann, Thorsten & Raith, Matthias G.
- 273 An extension of the Raiffa Kalai Smorodinsky solution to bargaining problems with claims
by Gerber, Anke
- 272 Selection between pareto-optimal outcomes in 2-person bargaining
by Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf
- 271 Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part V: Operations on scales, and evaluation of prospects
by Albers, Wulf
- 270 Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part IV: Task dependence of smallest received money units, nonexistence of general utility functions, and related paradoxa
by Albers, Wulf
- 269 Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part III: Perception of numerical information, and relations to traditional solution concepts
by Albers, Wulf
- 268 The selection of mixed strategies in 2 x 2 bimatrix games
by Albers, Wulf & Vogt, Bodo
- 267 Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 bimatrix games with preplay communication
by Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf
- 266 Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part II: Exactness selection rule, and confirming results
by Albers, Wulf & Albers, Eike & Albers, Leif & Vogt, Bodo
- 265 Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part I: Numerical response as a process, exactness, scales, and structure of scales
by Albers, Wulf
- 264 Coalition formation in general NTU games
by Gerber, Anke
- 263 Characterizations of two extended Walras solutions for open economies
by Korthues, Bernd
- 262 Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions
by Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel
- 261 An improvement on the existence proof of joint plan equilibria
by Simon, Robert Samuel
- 260 The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets: Part II
by Simon, Robert Samuel
- 259 The welfare implications of an ecological tax reform under monopoly
by Bayındır-Upmann, Thorsten
- 258 A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies
by Peleg, Bezalel
- 257 The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation
by Sudhölter, Peter & Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 256 Consistency and its convers: an approach for economies
by Korthues, Bernd
- 255 The existence of Nash equilibria in two-person, infinitely repeated undiscounted games of incomplete information
by Simon, Robert Samuel
- 254 Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies
by Peleg, Bezalel
- 253 The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter
- 252 The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets: Part I
by Simon, Robert Samuel
- 251 A further extension of the KKMS theorem
by Kannai, Yakar & Wooders, Myrna H.
- 250 Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems
by Sudhölter, Peter
- 249 Two games of interjurisdictional competition where local governments provide industrial public goods
by Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten
- 248 Separable aggregation and the existence of Nash equilibrium
by Kukushkin, Nikolaj Serafimovič
- 247 A formal approach to Nash's program
by Peleg, Bezalel
- 246 Airport problems and consistent solution rules
by Potters, Jos & Sudhölter, Peter
- 245 An exact implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in dominant strategies
by Trockel, Walter
- 244 The Nash solution as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on bargaining games
by Gerber, Anke
- 243 Pigouvian taxes may fail even in a perfect world
by Requate, Till
- 242 Alienated extensions and common knowledge worlds
by Simon, Robert Samuel
- 241 Existence of generalized Walras equilibria for generalized economies
by Korthues, Bernd
- 240 The Shapley value for countably many players
by Pallaschke, Diethard & Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 239 Interjurisdictional competition in emission taxes under imperfect competition of local firms
by Upmann, Thorsten
- 238 Interjurisdictional tax competition, provision of two local public goods, and environmental policy
by Upmann, Thorsten
- 237 Conservation of energy in nonatomic games
by Ortmann, Michael
- 236 Preservation of differences, potential, conservity
by Ortmann, Michael
- 235 On the existence of equilibrium in hierarchically structured economies
by Spanjers, Willy
- 234 Green taxes in oligopoly revisited: exogenous versus endogenous number of firms
by Requate, Till
- 233 Excessive and under-investment: on the incentives to adopt new technologies under Pigouvian taxes and tradeable permits
by Requate, Till
- 232 Solution concepts for c-convex, assignment, and m2-games
by Sudhölter, Peter
- 231 A Walrasian approach to bargaining games
by Trockel, Walter
- 230 An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter
- 229 Endogenous structures of trade relationships in hierarchically structured economies with bid and ask prices and two commodities
by Spanjers, Willy
- 228 Bargaining with incomplete information: an axiomatic approach
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 227 Concave utility and individual demand
by Kannai, Yakar
- 226 Arbitrage and monopolistic market structures
by Spanjers, Willy
- 225 Bid and ask prices in hierarchically structured economies with two commodities
by Spanjers, Willy
- 224 Arbitrage and Walrasian equilibrium in hierarchically structured economies
by Spanjers, Willy
- 223 Population and environmental quality
by Cronshaw, Mark B. & Requate, Till
- 222 Incentives to innovate under emission taxes and tradeable permits
by Requate, Till
- 221 Entwurf zur Verbesserung der Lenkungseffizienz der Selbstbeteiligung in der GKV am Beispiel Zahnersatz. Der Proportionaltarif mit differenziertem Selbstbehalt
by Winkler, Walter
- 220 Independence for characterizing axioms of the pre-nucleolus
by Sudhölter, Peter
- 219 Equivalence of effluent taxes and permits for environmental regulation of several local monopolies
by Requate, Till
- 218 A mathematical note on the structure of SYMLOG directions
by Betten, Dieter & Ostmann, Axel
- 217 Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: approximate (NTU) cores in large economies
by Allen, Beth
- 216 Pollution control under imperfect competition: asymmetric Bertrand oligopoly with linear technologies
by Requate, Till
- 215 Representation of CII-Games and the expected contract value
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 214 Zur Prominenzstruktur von Zahlenangaben bei diffuser numerischer Information. Ein Experiment mit kontrolliertem Grad der Diffusität
by Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf
- 213 Star shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous games and application to weighted majority games
by Sudhölter, Peter
- 212 Pollution control under imperfect competition via taxes or permits: Cournot Duopoly
by Requate, Till
- 211 Incentives in market games with asymmetric information
by Allen, Beth
- 210 Permits or taxes? How to regulate Cournot Duopoly with polluting firms
by Requate, Till
- 209 The kernel of homogeneous games with steps
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter
- 208 Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
by Schmeidler, David & Tauman, Yair
- 207 Linear representability without completeness and transitivity
by Trockel, Walter
- 206 Central bank policy under strategic wage setting
by Bieta, Volker
- 205 Robust implementation under alternative information structures
by Corchón, Luis C. & Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio
- 204 Nash equilibria of informational extensions
by Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič
- 203 On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives
by Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič
- 202 The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps
by Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter
- 201 Informationsverarbeitungsstrukturen in begrenzt rationalen komplexen individuellen Entscheidungen
by Brunwinkel, Andrea
- 200 On the value of having the decision on the outcome of others
by Albers, Wulf & Zamir, Shmuel
- 199 Implementing demand equilibria as stable states of a revealed demand approach
by Albers, Wulf & Laing, James D.
- 198 Wage formation and credibility
by Bieta, Volker & Straub, Martin
- 197 An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem
by Trockel, Walter
- 195 Directed and weighted majority games
by Krohn, Ingomar & Sudhölter, Peter
- 194 Dynamic Bertrand Edgeworth competition with entry, exit decisions
by Requate, Till
- 193 The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games
by Rosenmüller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel
- 192 Repeated Bertrand Edgeworth competition with increasing marginal costs
by Requate, Till
- 191 Eine spieltheoretische Variante des Maximum-Prinzips
by Vorobʹev, Nikolaj N.
- 190 Fee games: (N)TU-games with incomplete information
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 189 Die Ausgestaltung von Geldpolitiken unter dem Einfluß eines Kontrollfehlers beim Geldangebotsprozeß der Zentralbank
by Bieta, Volker
- 188 Sources of prominence in computer aided experimental spatial games
by Albers, Wulf & Laing, James D.
- 187 A bargaining problem with transferable utility
by Weidner, Frank
- 186 Informationsstrukturen als Determinanten für den Erfolg von Geldpolitiken und die Bedeutung der Ausgestaltung der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen in einer Ökonomie
by Bieta, Volker
- 185 Domination, core and solution
by Bondareva, Olga
- 184 Fusionen: ein einfaches Spiel als Beispiel sowie eine neue Charakterisierung des Banzhafwertes
by Ostmann, Axel
- 183 Revealed fuzzy preferences
by Bondareva, Olga
- 182 On optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with lack of information on one side
by Heuer, Martin
- 181 Präferenzoffenbarung wirtschaftspolitischer Entscheidungsträger als Element der ¬Pollitikgestaltung [Politikgestaltung] im Kontext der asymmetrischen Information
by Bieta, Volker
- 180 On the Harsanyi-Selten value
by Weidner, Frank
- 179 Implementing the modified LH-algorithm
by Krohn, Ingomar & Moltzahn, S. & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, P. & Wallmeier, H.-M.
- 178 Wirtschaftspolitiken bei asymmetrischer Information als Resultat der "incentive" Struktur einer Politikinstanz, eine Steuerung der Ökonomie durch "pooling equilibria" oder "separating equilibria"
by Bieta, Volker
- 177 A multi-person approach towards the maximization of the average rate of return
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 176 The nucleolus of a game without side payments
by Bondareva, Olga
- 175 Nash implementation with renegotiation in the case of two agents
by Homann, Detlev
- 174 Asymptotically optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information
by Heuermann, Martina
- 173 Über Informationsprobleme bei der Implementation von Mechanismen
by Trockel, Walter
- 172 Homogeneous games as anti step functions
by Sudhölter, Peter
- 170 Incomplete contracts and Nash implementation in the case of two agents
by Homann, Detlev
- 169 Simple games: on order and symmetry
by Ostmann, Axel
- 168 A multi-person approach towards the maximization of the average rate of return
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 167 A contribution to the macro theory of comparative economic systems
by Ichiishi, Tatsuro
- 166 Remarks on cooperative games with incomplete information
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 165 Comparative cooperative game theory
by Ichiishi, Tatsuro
- 164 Theorems on closed coverings of a simplex and their applications to cooperative game theory
by Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Idzik, Adam
- 163 A discrete approach to general equilibrium and NTU-games
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 162 Uniqueness of individual demand at almost every budget via Sard's theorem
by Trockel, Walter
- 161 Games and incomplete information
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 160 Discounted two person zero sum games with lack of information on both sides
by Heuer, Martin
- 159 Aspirations and aspiration adjustment in location games
by Albers, Wulf
- 158 Beiträge zum begrenzt rationalen Verhalten
by Albers, Wulf
- 157 An invariance theorem for preferences and some applications
by Trockel, Walter
- 156 Life-length of process with elements of decreasing importance
by Ostmann, Axel
- 155 Equilibria in markets with incomplete information on qualities
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 154 An information-theoretic approach to infinitely repeated games with lack of information on both sides
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 153 The rôle of nondegeneracy and homogeneity in n-person game theory
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 152 Ergebnisse experimenteller Standortspiele II
by Albers, Wulf
- 151 Ergebnisse experimenteller Standortspiele I
by Albers, Wulf
- 150 Classification of price-invariant preferences
by Trockel, Walter
- 149 Games and incomplete information. A survey: Part II
by Heuer, Martin
- 148 An algorithm for the construction of homogeneous games
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 147 Statistically varying K-person games with incomplete information
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 146 Games and incomplete information. A survey: Part I
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 145 Two-person bargaining between threat and fair solution
by Albers, Wulf
- 144 Construction of homogeneous zero-sum games
by Sudhölter, Peter
- 143 Homogeneous games with countably many players
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 142 Discrimination of equally sized subsets for discrete, memoryless channels
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 141 Für Abhängige keinen Zugewinn?
by Ostmann, Axel
- 140 Classifying three person games
by Ostmann, Axel
- 139 Empirische Analyse der Minimaldarstellung von Parlamenten
by Bieta, Volker
- 138 Homogeneous games: recursive structure and computation
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 137 The structure of homogeneous games
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 136 A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 7: a bargaining problem with transaction costs on one side
by Selten, Reinhard
- 135 Homogeneous games with countably many players
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 134 Statistically varying games with incomplete information
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 133 Geordnete einfache Spiele
by Ostmann, Axel
- 132 A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution concept
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard
- 131 The biological counterpart to non-cooperative game theory
by Hammerstein, Peter
- 130 Institutional utilitarianism
by Selten, Reinhard
- 129 Are cartel laws bad for business
by Selten, Reinhard
- 128 Weighted majority games and the matrix of homogeneity
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 127 Wahlen, Repraesentation und der Mechanismus des Proporzes
by Ostmann, Axel
- 126 Kernel and core of replicated market games
by Klein, Ulrich
- 125 On the prominence structure of the decimal system
by Albers, Wulf & Albers, Gisela
- 124 On the minimal representation of homogeneous games
by Ostmann, Axel
- 123 End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner's dilemma supergames
by Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf
- 122 Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 10 to 12
by Selten, Reinhard
- 121 Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 1 to 9
by Selten, Reinhard
- 120 Game theory in the ecological context
by Riechert, Susan E. & Hammerstein, Peter
- 119 Equal division payoff bounds for 3-person characteristic function experiments
by Selten, Reinhard
- 118 Comparison of two theories for characteristic function experiments
by Selten, Reinhard & Krischker, Wilhelm
- 117 Elementary theory of slack ridden imperfect competition
by Selten, Reinhard
- 116 Ein Zugang zu Differentialspielen
by Ostmann, Axel
- 115 On homogeneous weights for simple games
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 114 A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of desirable properties
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard
- 113 Original oder Fälschung: Gleichgewichtsauswahl in einem Verhandlungsspiel mit unvollständiger Information
by Selten, Reinhard & Güth, Werner
- 112 Cu mi lernu esperanton
by Selten, Reinhard & Pool, Jonathan
- 111 Equal division kernel and referenc coalitions in three-person games
by Crott, Helmut W. & Scholz, Roland W. & Albers, Wulf
- 110 Formale Konzepte eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens
by Klopstech, Angela & Selten, Reinhard
- 109 The asymmetric war of attrition
by Hammerstein, Peter & Parker, Geoffrey A.
- 108 From ability to pay to concepts of equal sacrifice
by Richter, Wolfram F.
- 107 Projekt Standortspiele. 2. Bericht
by Albers, Wulf & Huttel, G. & Ostmann, A. & Richter, W.F. & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Straub, M. & Wallmeier, H.-M.
- 106 A normative justification of progressive taxation: how to compromise on Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky
by Richter, Wolfram F.
- 105 A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 2: Games in standard form
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard
- 104 Das erlernte Schlußverhalten, eine experimentelle Untersuchung
by Stoecker, Rolf
- 103 LP games with sufficiently many players
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 102 On income tax functions
by Richter, Wolfram F. & Hampe, J. Felix
- 101 The partially pegging exchange rate problem: a three-country model
by Chen, John-ren
- 100 The effects of the partially pegging exchange rate policy in a small economy
by Chen, John-ren
- 99 Der Kern fuer n-Personen-Einfache-Produktionsspiele
by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
- 98 The equal division kernel: an equitiy approach to coalition formation and payoff distribution in n-person games
by Crott, Helmut W. & Albers, Wulf
- 97 Eine ökonometrische Untersuchung über die Auswirkungen der Importhemmnisse der Industrieländer für die Industrieerzeugnisse der Dritten Welt auf die ökonomische Entwicklung der Entwicklungsländer: eine Fallstudie Taiwans
by Chen, John-ren
- 96 Equilibrium point selection in a bargaining situation with opportunity costs
by Selten, Reinhard & Leopold, Ulrike
- 95 A note on "An impossibility result concerning n-person bargaining games"
by Huttel, Götz & Richter, Wolfram F.
- 94 Taxation according to ability to pay
by Richter, Wolfram F.
- 93 Values of non-sidepayment games and their application in the theory of public goods
by Rosenmüller, Joachim
- 92 A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 2: Consequences of desirable properties
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard
- 91 A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 1: Preliminary discussion
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard
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