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On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives

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  • Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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  • Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič, 2017. "On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 203, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:203
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2909783/2911484
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    Cited by:

    1. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1999. "Potential games: a purely ordinal approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 279-283, September.
    2. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2017. "Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 1-12.
    3. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1997. "An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 269-273, December.
    4. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2014. "Strong equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," MPRA Paper 55499, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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