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A Walrasian approach to bargaining games

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  • Trockel, Walter

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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  • Trockel, Walter, 2017. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 231, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:231
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roth, Alvin E, 1978. "The Nash Solution and the Utility of Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 587-594, May.
    2. Roth, Alvin, 2012. "The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-9.
    3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Trockel, Walter, 2011. "Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 355, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
    3. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2020. "Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Ha-Essential Equilibria," Working Papers CIE 130, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    4. Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
    5. Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 322, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    6. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.
    7. Alon, Shiri & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: An axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 60-71.
    8. Brangewitz, Sonja & Gamp, Jan-Philip, 2016. "Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 453, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    9. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2022. "Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 635-649, December.
    10. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
    11. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2014. "Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 529-554, November.
    12. Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 308, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    13. Brangewitz, Sonja & Gamp, Jan-Philip, 2013. "Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 224-227.
    14. Duman, Papatya & Trockel, Walter, 2020. "Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: $H_{\alpha}$ -Essential Equilibria," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 632, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

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