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Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies
Citations
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Cited by:
- Barrett, Christopher B. & Bailey, DeeVon, 1999.
"Are Agricultural Experiment Station Faculty Salaries Competitively Or Monopsonistically Determined?,"
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-10, April.
- Barrett, Christopher B. & Bailey, DeeVon, 1999. "Are Agricultural Experiment Station Faculty Salaries Competitively or Monopsonistically Determined?," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-10, April.
- Barrett, Christopher B. & Bailey, DeeVon, 1998. "Are Agricultural Experiment Station Faculty Salaries Competitively Or Monopsonistically Determined?," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers 28370, Utah State University, Economics Department.
- Basak, Suleyman & Makarov, Dmitry, 2012.
"Difference in interim performance and risk taking with short-sale constraints,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 377-392.
- Basak, Suleyman & Makarov, Dmitry, 2010. "Difference in Interim Performance and Risk Taking with Short-Sale Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 8072, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Suleyman Basak & Dmitry Makarov, 2010. "Difference in Interim Performance and Risk Taking with Short-sale Constraints," Working Papers w0159, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Suleyman Basak & Dmitry Makarov, 2010. "Difference in Interim Performance and Risk Taking with Short-sale Constraints," Working Papers w0159, New Economic School (NES).
- Zhen Wang & Tomislav Vukina, 2017. "Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 120(3), pages 219-249, April.
- Christian Grund & Dirk Sliwka, 2005.
"Envy and Compassion in Tournaments,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 187-207, March.
- Grund, Christian & Sliwka, Dirk, 2002. "Envy and Compassion in Tournaments," IZA Discussion Papers 647, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Grund, Christian & Sliwka, Dirk, 2002. "Envy and Compassion in Tournaments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 32/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Hans K. Hvide & Yanren Zhang, 2021. "Too big to succeed? Overstaffing in firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 784-798, November.
- Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005.
"Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts,"
2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI
19522, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24639, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Herbertz, Claus & Sliwka, Dirk, 2013. "When higher prizes lead to lower efforts—The impact of favoritism in tournaments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 188-191.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2012. "Internal labor markets and worker rents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 491-509.
- Derek Clark & Christian Riis, 2001.
"Rank-order tournaments and selection,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 167-191, June.
- Clark, D.J. & Riis, C., 1996. "Rank-Order Tournaments and Selection," Memorandum 1996_027, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Michael Babington & Sebastian J. Goerg & Carl Kitchens, 2020.
"Do Tournaments With Superstars Encourage or Discourage Competition?,"
Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(1), pages 44-63, January.
- Babington, Michael & Goerg, Sebastian J. & Kitchens, Carl, 2017. "Do Tournaments with Superstars Encourage or Discourage Competition?," IZA Discussion Papers 10755, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- James W. Bono, 2008. "Sales contests, promotion decisions and heterogeneous risk," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(4), pages 371-382.
- Braverman, Avishay & Guasch, J. Luis, 1988. "Institutional aspects of credit cooperatives," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7, The World Bank.
- Hisaki Kono & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2008. "Heterogeneous Contests And Less Informative Signals," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 113-126, March.
- Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2012.
"Pay for Percentile,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1805-1831, August.
- Barlevy, Gadi & Neal, Derek, 2009. "Pay for Percentile," IZA Discussion Papers 4383, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2011. "Pay for Percentile," NBER Working Papers 17194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2009. "Pay for percentile," Working Paper Series WP-09-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007.
"Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 208-214, December.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Sliwka, 2006.
"On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 523-547, October.
- Sliwka, Dirk, 2004. "On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations," IZA Discussion Papers 1423, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Hvide, Hans K. & Kristiansen, Eirik G., 2003.
"Risk taking in selection contests,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 172-179, January.
- Hvide, H.K. & Kristiansen, E.G., 1999. "Risk Taking in Selection Contests," Papers 5-99, Tel Aviv.
- Braverman, Avishay & Guasch, J. Luis, 1989. "Rural credit in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 219, The World Bank.
- Stracke, Rudi & Sunde, Uwe, 2014. "Dynamic Incentive Effects of Heterogeneity in Multi-Stage Promotion Contests," IZA Discussion Papers 8368, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Butter, F.A.G. den & Gameren, E. van, 1998. "Labour flows in a simulation model of the firm," Serie Research Memoranda 0034, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
- Vandegrift, Donald & Brown, Paul, 2003. "Task difficulty, incentive effects, and the selection of high-variance strategies: an experimental examination of tournament behavior," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 481-497, August.
- Michael Schwarz & Sergei Severinov, 2010. "Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(4), pages 893-922, October.
- Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2017. "Do tournaments solve the adverse selection problem?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 675-690, September.
- Amegashie, J.A. & Wu, X., 2004. "Self Selection in Competing All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers 2004-1, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Derek Neal, 2011. "The Design of Performance Pay in Education," NBER Working Papers 16710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yun, Jungyoll, 1997. "On the Efficiency of the Rank-Order Contract under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(3), pages 466-494, July.
- Michael Spence, 2002.
"Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 434-459, June.
- Spence, A. Michael, 2001. "Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2001-6, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Fares, M'hand & Orozco, Luis, 2014.
"Tournament Mechanism in Wine-Grape Contracts: Evidence from a French Wine Cooperative,"
Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 320-345, December.
- M'Hand Fares & Luis Orozco, 2014. "Tournament Mechanism in Wine-Grape Contracts: Evidence from a French Wine Cooperative," Post-Print hal-01093245, HAL.
- Theofanis Tsoulouhas & Kosmas Marinakis, 2007.
"Tournaments with Ex Post Heterogeneous Agents,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(41), pages 1-9.
- Theofanis Tsoulouhas & Kosmas Marinakis, 2007. "Tournaments with Ex Post Heterogeneous Agents," Working Paper Series 015, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2007.
- Hoffler, Felix & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Do new brooms sweep clean? When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 877-890, October.
- Donald Vandegrift & Abdullah Yavas & Paul Brown, 2007. "Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(4), pages 345-368, December.
- Riis, Christian, 2008. "Efficient Contests," MPRA Paper 10906, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel, 2012. "Dismissal Tournaments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 547-562, December.
- Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-570, October.
- Vandegrift, Donald & Brown, Paul, 2005. "Gender differences in the use of high-variance strategies in tournament competition," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 834-849, December.
- Golman, Russell & Bhatia, Sudeep, 2012. "Performance evaluation inflation and compression," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 534-543.
- Gürtler, Oliver & Kräkel, Matthias, 2010.
"Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 180-191, August.
- Gürtler, Oliver & Kräkel, Matthias, 2008. "Optimal Tournament Contracts for Heterogeneous Workers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 234, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2010. "Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 743-752, February.
- Michael Schwarz & Sergei Severinov, 2009. "Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?," NBER Working Papers 15136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:41:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lorens A. Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2023. "Team Diversity and Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2497-2516, April.