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The Rationality of Ideology

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ramirez Carlos D., 2011. "The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 291-318, November.
  2. François Facchini & Louis Jaeck, 2019. "Ideology and the rationality of non-voting," Rationality and Society, , vol. 31(3), pages 265-286, August.
  3. Kevin Grier & Michael Munger, 1986. "The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 349-361, September.
  4. Dennis, Christopher & Bishin, Benjamin & Nicolaou, Politimy, 2000. "Constituent diversity and congress: the case of NAFTA," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 349-360, July.
  5. William R. Dougan & Ivette Jans, 1993. "Twain's Law of Politics," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(4), pages 518-536, October.
  6. J. O’Roark & William Wood, 2011. "Determinants of congressional minimum wage support: the role of economic education," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 209-225, April.
  7. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
  8. Michael Munger, 2009. "The principal difficulty: Besley’s neo-Rousseavian aspirations," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(2), pages 169-175, June.
  9. Benjamin Bishin & Jay Dow & James Adams, 2006. "Does democracy “suffer” from diversity? Issue representation and diversity in senate elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 201-215, October.
  10. Beth Rosenson, 2007. "Explaining legislators’ positions on outside income limits: Voting on honoraria ceilings in the U.S. Senate, 1981–1983," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 111-128, October.
  11. René Lindstädt & Ryan Wielen, 2011. "Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 119-148, July.
  12. Rex Pjesky & Daniel Sutter, 2002. "Searching for cincinnatus: Representatives' backgrounds and voting behavior," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(1), pages 74-86, March.
  13. Berggren, Niclas, 2003. "The Frailty of Economic Reforms: Political Logic and Constitutional Lessons," Ratio Working Papers 1, The Ratio Institute.
  14. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
  15. Zoltán Fazekas & Martin Ejnar Hansen, 2022. "Incentives for non-participation: absence in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997–2015," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 51-73, April.
  16. Melvin J. Hinich & Michael C. Munger, 1992. "A Spatial Theory of Ideology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 5-30, January.
  17. Dennis, Christopher & Medoff, Marshall H. & Magnera, Michael, 2008. "Constituents' economic interests and senator support for spending limitations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2443-2453, December.
  18. John A. Ferejohn, 1991. "Changes in Welfare Policy in the 1980s," NBER Chapters, in: Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pages 123-142, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. John Lott & W. Reed, 1989. "Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 75-96, April.
  20. Morong, Cyril, 1996. "Socio-economic elements in Public Choice research," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 559-569.
  21. Franklin G. Mixon & Rand W. Ressler & M. Troy Gibson, 2003. "Congressional Memberships as Political Advertising: Evidence from the U.S. Senate," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(2), pages 414-424, October.
  22. Tanger, Shaun M. & Laband, David N., 2009. "An empirical analysis of bill co-sponsorship in the U.S. Senate: The Tree Act of 2007," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 260-265, July.
  23. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
  24. Sutter, Daniel, 1999. "Discretionary policy implementation and reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 249-262, July.
  25. David T. Mitchell, 2006. "A Pitfall of New Growth Theory: Rhetoric, Rent Seeking and the Semi-Informed Voter," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 22(Fall 2006), pages 147-167.
  26. Gertrud Fremling & John Lott, 1988. "Televising legislatures: Some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 73-78, July.
  27. Glenn Parker & Matthew Dabros, 2012. "Last-period problems in legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 789-806, June.
  28. Jason DeBacker, 2012. "Political parties and political shirking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 651-670, March.
  29. Glenn Parker, 2005. "Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 333-354, March.
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