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Twain's Law of Politics

Author

Listed:
  • WILLIAM R. DOUGAN

    (Clemson University)

  • IVETTE JANS

    (University of Nebraska)

Abstract

This article models the electoral process as a game of incomplete information in which voters choose between candidates on the basis of the likelihood that each will fulfill the campaign promises made. The electorate's uncertainty about the future behavior of its representatives means that some candidates will win seats even though they are not committed to performing as promised. Moreover, because such candidates have more actions available to them than do their honest counterparts, they enjoy an electoral advantage until voters have acquired full information about them. This advantage makes a political career more attractive to dishonest individuals than to honest members of the same occupational class, so that dishonest people will tend disproportionately to enter politics.

Suggested Citation

  • William R. Dougan & Ivette Jans, 1993. "Twain's Law of Politics," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(4), pages 518-536, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:518-536
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463193005004007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dougan, William R & Munger, Michael C, 1989. "The Rationality of Ideology," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-142, April.
    2. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April.
    3. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    4. John Lott & W. Reed, 1989. "Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 75-96, April.
    5. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    6. Snyder, James M, Jr, 1992. "Long-Term Investing in Politicians; or, Give Early, Give Often," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 15-43, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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