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Discretionary policy implementation and reform

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  • Sutter, Daniel

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  • Sutter, Daniel, 1999. "Discretionary policy implementation and reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 249-262, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:39:y:1999:i:3:p:249-262
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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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    8. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    10. Cowen, Tyler & Sutter, Daniel, 1998. "Why Only Nixon Could Go to China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 605-615, December.
    11. Kuran, Timur, 1987. "Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 642-665, September.
    12. Henry W. Chappell & Thomas M. Havrilesky & Rob Roy McGregor, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218.
    13. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1992. "The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 889-906.
    14. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
    15. Caporale, Tony & Winter, Harold, 1998. "Political influence over Supreme Court criminal procedure cases," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 465-475, May.
    16. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-1235, December.
    17. Drazen, Allan & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 598-607, June.
    18. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
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