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Searching for cincinnatus: Representatives' backgrounds and voting behavior

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  • Rex Pjesky
  • Daniel Sutter

Abstract

Proponents of legislative term limits express concern about professional politicians, individuals who have no other occupation than running for and holding office. Term limits presumably will help allow the reemergence of the citizen-legislator. This paper examines whether pre-political background affects Congressional voting, specifically concentrating on whether a business background affects U.S. Chamber of Commerce vote scores. Business background significantly affects voting in the House, even with party affiliation and corporate and labor campaign contributions included as control variables, but background variables are insignificant for Senate voting. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2002

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  • Rex Pjesky & Daniel Sutter, 2002. "Searching for cincinnatus: Representatives' backgrounds and voting behavior," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(1), pages 74-86, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:30:y:2002:i:1:p:74-86
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02299148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. J. Brian O’Roark, 2012. "Economists in Congress: How Economic Education Motivates Votes on Free Trade in Congress," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 27(Spring 20), pages 83-101.

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