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A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2014. "Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 3779-3813, December.
  2. Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry, 2017. "Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(3), pages 690-713, March.
  3. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  4. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Sweet Talk: A Theory of Persuasion," MPRA Paper 18697, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé, 2013. "Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 451-467, September.
  6. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.
  7. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  8. Elchanan Ben‐Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2019. "Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(2), pages 529-566, March.
  9. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021. "Strategic interpretations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
  10. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2020. "Custodial Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2020-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  11. Penélope Hernández & Bernhard von Stengel, 2014. "Nash Codes for Noisy Channels," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1221-1235, December.
  12. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L Lipman, 2018. "Disclosure and Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1471-1501.
  13. Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., 2015. "Social accountability to contain corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 158-168.
  14. Jehiel, Philippe, 2021. "Communication with forgetful liars," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(2), May.
  15. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
  16. Péter Eső & Ádám Galambos, 2013. "Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 263-282, February.
  17. Sher, Itai, 2011. "Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 409-419, March.
  18. ALHENDI Osama, 2019. "Language Policy And Economics: Does English Language Accelerate The Wheel Of Development In The Economies Or Not? A Review," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(2), pages 366-379, December.
  19. P. Milgrom, 2009. "What the Seller Wont Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 3.
  20. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
  21. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, May.
  22. Burdea, Valeria & Montero, Maria & Sefton, Martin, 2023. "Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 113-149.
  23. Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, 2013. "Go Figure: The Strategy of Nonliteral Speech," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 186-212, May.
  24. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1631-1660, July.
  25. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
  26. Weiguo Zhang & Gilles Grenier, 2012. "How can Language be linked to Economics? A Survey of Two Strands of Research," Working Papers 1206E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  27. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  28. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," Papers 2410.17503, arXiv.org.
  29. Chen, Ying & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Effective persuasion," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1310, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  30. Yun Wang, 2015. "Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers," Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  31. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
  32. repec:ehu:dfaeii:8770 is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Gieczewski, Germán, 2022. "Verifiable communication on networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  34. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
  35. Matthew Johnson & Alexander Gutfraind & Kiyan Ahmadizadeh, 2014. "Evader interdiction: algorithms, complexity and collateral damage," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 222(1), pages 341-359, November.
  36. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-68.
  37. Mike Felgenhauer & Elisabeth Schulte, 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 74-105, November.
  38. Evans, R. & Reiche, S., 2022. "When is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2222, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  39. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  40. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2012. "A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(6), pages 1057-1082.
  41. Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  42. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  43. Mike Felgenhauer, 2019. "Endogenous Persuasion with Costly Verification," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(3), pages 1054-1087, July.
  44. Suzuki, Toru, 2020. "Efficient communication and indexicality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 156-165.
  45. repec:ehu:ikerla:16268 is not listed on IDEAS
  46. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2009. "Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-255, May.
  47. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 102, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
  48. Péter Eso & Chris Wallace, 2022. "Evidence Disclosure in Competitive Markets," Economics Series Working Papers 980, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  49. Erlanson, Albin & Kleiner, Andreas, 2020. "Costly verification in collective decisions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  50. Honryo, Takakazu, 2018. "Dynamic persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 36-58.
  51. Mike Felgenhauer & Petra Loerke, 2017. "Bayesian Persuasion With Private Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(3), pages 829-856, August.
  52. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Screening for breakthroughs," Papers 2011.10090, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  53. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  54. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Rational attitude change by reference cues when information elaboration requires effort," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 90-107.
  55. Ying Chen & Wojciech Olszewski, 2014. "Effective Persuasion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 319-347, May.
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