IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v204y2022ics0022053122000849.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Verifiable communication on networks

Author

Listed:
  • Gieczewski, Germán

Abstract

This paper models the diffusion of verifiable information on a network populated by biased agents. Some agents, who are exogenously informed, choose whether to inform their neighbors. Informing a neighbor affects her behavior, but also enables her to inform others. Agents cannot lie; they can, however, feign ignorance. The model yields three main results. First, unless a large set of agents is initially informed, learning is incomplete. Second, full learning is more likely for moderate than for extreme states of the world. Third, when agents are forward-looking, concerns about learning cascades lead to an endogenous division of the population into like-minded groups that do not communicate with each other.

Suggested Citation

  • Gieczewski, Germán, 2022. "Verifiable communication on networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:204:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000849
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105494
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053122000849
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105494?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
    3. Lones Smith & Peter Sorensen, 2000. "Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 371-398, March.
    4. Alexander Wolitzky, 2018. "Learning from Others' Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 2763-2801, October.
    5. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2020. "Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2281-2328, November.
    6. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    7. , & , & ,, 2016. "Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
    9. Francis Bloch & Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448, May.
    10. Dewan, Torun & Squintani, Francesco, 2018. "Leadership with Trustworthy Associates," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 844-859, November.
    11. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
    12. Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & , & ,, 2015. "Communication and influence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    13. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    14. Peter M. DeMarzo & Dimitri Vayanos & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 2003. "Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 909-968.
    15. Daron Acemoglu & Munther A. Dahleh & Ilan Lobel & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011. "Bayesian Learning in Social Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(4), pages 1201-1236.
    16. Torun Dewan & Andrea Galeotti & Christian Ghiglino & Francesco Squintani, 2015. "Information Aggregation and Optimal Structure of the Executive," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(2), pages 475-494, February.
    17. Torun Dewan & Andrea Galeotti & Christian Ghiglino & Francesco Squintani, 2015. "Information aggregation and optimal structure of the executive," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 59632, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Rajiv Sethi & Muhamet Yildiz, 2012. "Public Disagreement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 57-95, August.
    19. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    20. Peter D. Howe & Matto Mildenberger & Jennifer R. Marlon & Anthony Leiserowitz, 2015. "Geographic variation in opinions on climate change at state and local scales in the USA," Nature Climate Change, Nature, vol. 5(6), pages 596-603, June.
    21. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01053478 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. , & ,, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.
    23. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Syngjoo Choi & Edoardo Gallo & Shachar Kariv, 2015. "Networks in the laboratory," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1551, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Buechel, Berno & Hellmann, Tim & Klößner, Stefan, 2015. "Opinion dynamics and wisdom under conformity," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 240-257.
    3. Foerster, Manuel, 2019. "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011. "Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 3-49, March.
    5. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2015. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 21-59, May.
    6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    7. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2020. "Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2281-2328, November.
    8. , & , & ,, 2014. "Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    9. Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
    10. Acemoglu, Daron & Ozdaglar, Asuman & ParandehGheibi, Ali, 2010. "Spread of (mis)information in social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 194-227, November.
    11. Azomahou, T. & Opolot, D., 2014. "Beliefs dynamics in communication networks," MERIT Working Papers 2014-034, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    12. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
    13. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
    14. Migrow, Dimitri, 2021. "Designing communication hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    15. de Martí, Joan & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Network games with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 221-240.
    16. Bohren, J. Aislinn, 2016. "Informational herding with model misspecification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 222-247.
    17. Fang, Aili & Wang, Lin & Wei, Xinjiang, 2019. "Social learning with multiple true states," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 521(C), pages 375-386.
    18. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs," Working Papers - Economics wp2014_04.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    19. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Rational attitude change by reference cues when information elaboration requires effort," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 90-107.
    20. Michel Grabisch & Antoine Mandel & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Emily Tanimura, 2018. "Strategic Influence in Social Networks," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(1), pages 29-50, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Verifiable information; Networks; Social learning; Strategic communication; Learning cascades;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:204:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000849. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.